AfD is growing in strength. Expert: from Poland's point of view, this is dangerous
— In AfD's perspective, Germany's most important partner in the East should be Russia. It is seen as a power with which Germany should maintain good relations, even at the expense of Poland or Central Europe more broadly — says Dr. Łukasz Jasiński, a Germany analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, in an interview with Onet.
Piotr Gruszka: Support for AfD has reached a record 29%, and the party is clearly ahead of the CDU/CSU. Where does the strength of the Alternative for Germany come from?
Dr. Łukasz Jasiński: This is no longer a temporary surge, but a steady trend. AfD is currently leading many polls and gradually increasing its lead over the CDU/CSU. We're now talking about a stable advantage of several percentage points at the federal level. Moreover, AfD is the most popular party in the eastern states.
There are several sources of this growth, but the most important is that AfD is effectively taking over voters disappointed with other parties, such as the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats.
The main topic in Germany right now is the economic situation. Fears of deindustrialization and frustration over problems in entire industries, including key sectors for the German economy like automotive, are growing. So far, neither the Social Democrats under Olaf Scholz nor the Christian Democrats with Chancellor Friedrich Merz have found a convincing answer to these problems. AfD is benefiting from this growing social frustration, from the feeling that a certain development model is ending and Germany's future is becoming increasingly uncertain.
It also seems that the current strategy of isolating this party by other political forces, combined with social frustrations, works in AfD's favor. It fits into the party's narrative that there are two political camps in Germany: on one side, all the traditional parties that have failed citizens and led the country to its current situation, and on the other, AfD presenting itself as the only, literally, alternative.
A few years ago, AfD in power seemed like political fiction. Today, is it a realistic scenario?
The key, in my opinion, will be the second half of this year.
"AfD is not a party friendly to Poland"
First, by the end of the year, it will become clear whether the government can implement the reforms announced during the 2025 election campaign. These reforms are painful socially, as they involve limiting the welfare state in its current form, but they are necessary. Moreover, the German public itself expects decisive changes from Merz's government, aware of the seriousness of the situation. Meanwhile, most reforms have not only not been implemented but even finally agreed upon within the coalition.
Comparisons to the Scholz government, which got stuck in endless negotiations and public disputes between coalition partners, are increasingly common. This also contributes to rising support for AfD.
Second, a series of important state elections will take place in the fall in eastern Germany. Particular attention is on Saxony-Anhalt, where AfD has a real chance of a very good result, even taking power.
What will happen?
First, it will spark a debate about the sense and effectiveness of the "cordon sanitaire" around AfD. Second, it will give the party the opportunity to exercise real power for a full five-year term in one of the sixteen states. Third, it will give it indirect influence on federal policy, for example through its presence in the upper house, the Bundesrat.
Therefore, autumn and winter may be crucial. Then we will likely find out whether the current coalition can, at least partially, rebuild public support and stop AfD's rise in the polls.
But the problem also lies in the fact that isolating AfD is becoming increasingly difficult. Even if it remains arithmetically possible, it will require forming increasingly complex, sometimes even exotic, coalitions involving three or four parties.
And then the question arises: how long could such a government actually function, remain steerable, and maintain a stable majority?
Is the German "cordon sanitaire" around AfD not beginning to produce unintended consequences?
This is indeed one of the most important dilemmas in German politics. AfD was long considered a party of the eastern states, roughly speaking the former GDR. Today, that image is outdated. This was also shown by the elections to several state parliaments in the spring of this year. AfD achieves good results not only in the east but also in western states.
Of course, regional differences still exist, and local specifics still play a role, but AfD has become a nationwide party. However, we are observing yet another new trend. What's more,
What?
Compared to the last Bundestag elections, not only is the number of AfD voters growing, but also the group of people who are willing to consider voting for it at all. The broadening of the party's electoral potential is a new development.
Therefore, the question about the sense and effectiveness of further isolating AfD will return more and more frequently. The greater the support this party gains, the more often the question arises whether this strategy actually works or paradoxically helps AfD, especially since the party consistently portrays itself as an organization excluded by the political establishment of Germany.
I think the tension between growing public support for AfD and maintaining political isolation towards it will probably be one of the most important topics in German politics in the coming years.
How does AfD approach Poland?
As is often the case with populist movements, AfD's demands regarding international politics are quite vague and sometimes internally contradictory. It must also be remembered that this is a clearly divided party.
On one hand, there is a current that can be described as isolationist and, bluntly speaking, crudely pragmatic. I mean politicians who openly talk about the need to rebuild energy cooperation with Russia and argue that the German economy and German families need cheap Russian raw materials.
On the other hand, there is a more radical wing that presents views described by opponents as neo-Nazi and tinged with a certain historical revanchism. I mean, among other things, relativizing German war crimes by emphasizing alleged Polish crimes and guilt towards Germans, and tendencies to focus on the fate of the so-called expellees, but without a broader historical context, i.e., without pointing out that the Third Reich carried out a policy of forced population displacements in occupied Europe for years, such as the eviction of residents of Gdynia in the fall of 1939.
As for AfD's attitude towards Poland, the most characteristic thing is that the party is distant from Poland and not particularly interested in it. What is dangerous from a Polish point of view — regardless of which wing of the party we are talking about — is the fact that Poland and Central and Eastern Europe more broadly are not seen as a significant political entity.
In AfD's perspective, Germany's most important partner in the East should be Russia. It is seen as a power, a country with enormous resource wealth, and a partner with whom Germany should maintain good relations, even at the expense of Poland or Central Europe.
Of course, individual AfD politicians occasionally "pointedly" praise Poland, for example for its method of securing the border with Belarus. However, this does not change the overall picture. AfD is not a party friendly to Poland; it is reluctant towards us, at best indifferent.
"Risks for Poland"
Could the emerging MAGA–AfD axis be a problem for both Poland and our region?
In my view, in the long term, this cooperation may carry certain risks for Poland.
First of all, because both MAGA and AfD are hostile to transatlantic relations in the form we have known for decades. Both circles also seek to weaken the European Union and move away from the known model of European integration.
This cooperation also fits into a broader shift in the logic of thinking about alliances. Instead of permanent guarantees rooted in institutions and treaties, shallowly understood transactionalism and personal relationships and informal contacts between politicians are playing an increasing role. This, in turn, may in the long term weaken the predictability of American security guarantees for Poland and the entire region.
The second issue concerns AfD itself. The support that the MAGA movement gives to this party is very beneficial to it politically. It allows showing the German public that yes, traditional parties isolate it on the German political scene, but at the same time, it builds relationships with influential political circles in the United States. Through cooperation with MAGA, AfD shows its voters, both those already convinced to vote for it and potential ones, that it is not surrounded by any "cordon sanitaire" in international politics.
If MAGA and AfD could arrange Europe their way, what would it look like?
They show quite far-reaching ideological similarities. They concern both a rather free interpretation of concepts such as democracy and freedom of speech, and the vision of the future shape of Europe.
Both circles assume that Europe is currently in a deep identity and civilizational crisis. In their view, it is largely the result of uncontrolled migration and the dominance of left-liberal currents in public debate and the political life of individual countries.
Consequently, both MAGA and AfD promote a vision of rebuilding Europe primarily by strengthening nation-states and closing borders. This is a fundamental common point for both circles.
Both MAGA and AfD also advocate for essentially full freedom on the internet and a very far-reaching limitation of content moderation by digital platforms. Freedom of speech in their understanding means the possibility of uncontrolled dissemination of content, including those that may contain manipulation, hate speech, or harassment. This, of course, stands in opposition to attempts at the EU level to regulate the activities of (largely American) digital giants, which corresponds to MAGA's transactional, profit-focused "here and now" approach. AfD's support is also not accidental — according to studies, this party is most effective at navigating digital platforms, allowing it to reach new supporters.
Is their goal to weaken the European Union?
Here too, a clear convergence is visible. Both in the MAGA environment and in AfD, there is a strong aversion to the European Union, and often also a lack of understanding of how the EU functions. The dominant belief is that European integration excessively limits nation-states, that the EU is an emanation of "leftist elites," and that therefore the Union should be, if not broken up, then at least very much weakened.
"Mass outrage"
Migration is today a political fuel for both MAGA and AfD. How far are they willing to go?
In this regard, there is a very far-reaching convergence between MAGA and AfD. Both circles treat migration as one of the key challenges of modern politics and advocate for a much more restrictive migration policy than has previously dominated in many Western countries.
In the case of AfD, the most radical ideas regularly return, including the idea of remigration, i.e., actually depriving people with so-called migration background — as people in Germany whose at least one parent was a migrant are called — of citizenship and deporting them. This is a separate topic, but the revelation by investigative journalists in 2024 of AfD politicians' participation in secret meetings with far-right ideologues of this understanding of "remigration," such as Austrian Martin Sellner, sparked mass protests and huge public outrage and harmed AfD in the elections to the European Parliament.
With all the similarities, where is the line between them?
Currently, the most important difference concerns the approach to Donald Trump's foreign policy, especially the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran.
AfD is deeply divided on this issue and quite critical of this conflict. The key role is played by fear of its economic consequences and a possible energy crisis that would further weaken an already symbolic economic growth.
It must be remembered that Donald Trump is a very unpopular politician in Germany, and his unpredictable international policy also causes concern among AfD supporters.
Therefore, the party, especially with an eye on the autumn state elections, tries to distance itself from Trump. This seems to be currently one of the main differences between AfD and the MAGA environment. It should also be noted that within the MAGA movement itself, the war with Iran and Trump's belligerent stance are not particularly popular either.
But there is also one structural difference between AfD and MAGA.
What?
AfD is simply a political party. It has its leadership, federal and state-level structures, and institutional mechanisms of functioning.
MAGA, on the other hand, is not a party. It is a broad political movement bringing together very different circles of the American right that have united around Donald Trump and the slogan "Make America Great Again" since 2016.
It must also be remembered that within the MAGA movement itself, there are various currents. A good example is Elon Musk, who at the beginning of the current term worked with Trump as his advisor on government efficiency, but later came into conflict with him and began to distance himself.
So we are not dealing here with a classic and frequent international cooperation between two parties on the level of some formalized structure, like, for example, the European People's Party or other such internationals known from European politics. In the case of AfD and MAGA, it is an uninstitutionalized cooperation, based on informal channels, between a party and a very influential but also heterogeneous political movement.
Is the rapprochement between AfD and MAGA a problem for Chancellor Merz?
As for the chancellor, the situation is specific. On one hand, he does not officially refer to the cooperation between AfD and the MAGA movement. He does not comment on it directly and rather tries not to give it additional significance. At the same time, no one in Germany intends to restrict contacts between AfD and the MAGA environment. AfD, despite all the controversies, is still a legally operating political party and has full right to seek allies abroad.
However, German authorities regularly oppose the narrative coming from the MAGA environment. This happens especially when American politicians associated with this movement criticize the European Union for alleged deficits in democracy, consider the EU's attempts to regulate digital content as "censorship," or accuse Germany that applying a "cordon sanitaire" around AfD is undemocratic.
In such situations, the chancellor and his ministers react very decisively. They emphasize that this is interference in Germany's internal affairs and that American interlocutors do not particularly understand Europe and apparently interpret key concepts such as democracy and freedom of speech differently.
