Diplomatic ties only half the story
By Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos
For years, Taiwan’s position in Latin America has often been evaluated through a simple metric: the number of countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei.
Every diplomatic switch is treated as a strategic setback. Every new recognition of Beijing is viewed as evidence of China’s growing influence. By that standard, China’s position in Latin America appears stronger than ever.
Over the past two decades, China has steadily expanded its economic footprint throughout the region. It has become one of Latin America’s most important trading partners, invested billions of dollars in infrastructure and energy projects, financed governments and persuaded several countries to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China.
Measured through trade, investment and diplomatic recognition, Beijing’s strategy has produced significant successes. However, beyond those numbers, the more important question is whether those successes have translated into durable political influence or not.
Recent developments across Latin America suggest the answer may be more complicated than many policymakers assume.
Panama provides one example. After establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing in 2017, Panama became one of China’s most celebrated diplomatic victories in the Western Hemisphere. Its participation in the Belt and Road Initiative appeared to symbolize China’s growing regional influence.
Yet last year, Panama withdrew from the initiative following pressure from the US regarding China’s growing presence around the Panama Canal. This was strongly protested by China, but despite this setback, Panama maintains an almost intact economic relationship with China. Trade continued. Commercial ties continued. However, the political environment surrounding those relationships definitively changed.
The lesson is not that China failed in Panama. The lesson is that the economic relationship built over the years did not translate into lasting political influence strong enough to withstand the US hegemony in the region.
In Venezuela, a similar pattern has been observed over the past few months. Years of Chinese engagement helped establish the South American country as one of Beijing’s closest regional partnerships. Yet changing political realities have forced Caracas to pursue a more pragmatic relationship with Washington while preserving its ties with China.
As the US Embassy resumed operations in Caracas and Venezuelan oil once again began flowing toward the US market, Beijing found itself operating in a far more complicated political environment than the one it had enjoyed for much of the Chavez and Maduro eras.
In Nicaragua, one of Beijing’s closest political partners in Central America, authorities have taken several steps that appear designed to accommodate US concerns while maintaining relations with China. From releasing political prisoners to cancelling a visa free program that had allowed many Cubans to get closer to the US borders, the decisions taken by Daniel Ortega clearly demonstrate selective adjustment.
Even Cuba, long regarded as one of Beijing’s most reliable ideological partners in the Western Hemisphere, continues to struggle with economic and political pressures that Chinese support alone has been unable to resolve, and that have led the Cuban government to seek dialogue with Washington.
For Taiwan, however, Honduras may offer the most important lesson.
When Honduras switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2023, many observers viewed the decision as another example of China’s growing ability to shrink Taiwan’s international space. The diplomatic loss was real.
What happened afterward, however, has received far less attention. Expectations surrounding the relationship were high. Supporters of the switch anticipated expanded exports, major investment projects and broader economic opportunities. More than two years later, many of those expectations remain the subject of debate. A free trade agreement has yet to materialize, concerns regarding Chinese-linked projects have grown and congressional investigations of bilateral agreements are taking place.
At the same time, discussions surrounding Huawei’s role in the country’s telecommunications infrastructure have generated political controversy, while several prominent Honduran political figures, including President Nasry Asfura and President of the National Congress of Honduras Tomas Zambrano, have publicly discussed the possibility of restoring relations with Taiwan.
None of this suggests that a Honduran switch back to Taiwan is imminent, nor does it suggest that China is losing Latin America. What it does suggest is that diplomatic recognition and political influence are not the same thing.
This distinction matters because Taiwan’s own approach to Latin America has often been shaped by the realities of diplomatic competition with Beijing. Given Taiwan’s unique international situation, the focus on its relationship with current and former diplomatic allies is understandable, as diplomatic recognition remains an important component of Taiwan’s security and international standing.
Yet China’s experience in Latin America suggests that diplomatic victories do not automatically generate long-term influence.
Taiwan should pay attention to that lesson.
For decades, Taiwan built relationships throughout Latin America that extended far beyond formal diplomacy. Scholarship programs brought thousands of Latin American students to Taiwan. Technical assistance programs supported agricultural modernization, public health initiatives and economic development projects. Business relationships expanded. Educational exchanges multiplied. Local political leaders, civil servants, academics and entrepreneurs developed firsthand experience with Taiwan.
Many of these relationships continue to exist even in countries that no longer recognize Taiwan diplomatically.
Former scholarship recipients continue working in government, business and academia. Private-sector partnerships continue. Universities maintain cooperative relationships. Civil society organizations remain connected.
These networks rarely attract headlines, yet they represent a form of influence that often survives changes in diplomatic recognition.
The distinction is important because influence itself is more complex than many discussions about Taiwan’s international position suggest.
Economic influence and political influence are related, but they are not the same thing. Governments can change policy after elections. Diplomatic recognition can shift following a political decision.
China’s experience in Latin America illustrates this reality, yet recent developments suggest that economic engagement alone does not always guarantee political alignment, strategic loyalty or lasting influence.
The same logic applies in reverse. A diplomatic setback does not necessarily erase decades of goodwill, cooperation and engagement.
For Taiwan, that lesson may prove increasingly important as competition with China intensifies. While preserving diplomatic allies remains a legitimate objective, policymakers should be careful not to evaluate Taiwan’s regional position exclusively through that lens.
A country can recognize Beijing while maintaining positive views of Taiwan. Business leaders can continue working with Taiwanese partners. Universities can continue academic cooperation. Future political leaders can remain receptive to Taiwan’s perspectives even in the absence of formal diplomatic ties.
Rather than viewing Latin America solely through the prism of diplomatic competition, Taiwan has an opportunity to adopt a broader understanding of influence.
There is no doubt that China succeeded in winning diplomatic recognition from several countries, but whether it has converted those victories into durable political influence remains an open question.
Taiwan should pay close attention to the answer.
Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos is a Honduran journalist based in Taipei.
