New Wave on the Iran-Israel Front: Where Is the War Heading?
“Iran wants to avoid a second wave from the US that would target civilian infrastructure, while the US wants to resolve the Hormuz and nuclear issues without making the war more costly.”
10 June 2026 Wednesday 22:51
New Wave on the Iran-Israel Front: Where Is the War Heading?
Oral Toğa / AA Analysis
The first mutual missile exchange since the April 8 ceasefire between Iran and the US/Israel has sparked thoughts that the war has reignited, but interpreting this development as a resurgence of war could be misleading. Still, the situation is not without risks. After Hezbollah fired rockets at northern Israel and Israel struck Hezbollah targets in Beirut, Iran considered the attack a red line violation—claiming the ceasefire also covers Lebanon—and responded with missiles. However, each step remained measured, the strikes were limited, and US President Donald Trump called on both sides to stop within the first hour.
Why Is the Ceasefire Important for the Parties?
At this point, the ceasefire is significant for both the US and Iran. Although Iran appears to have forced its adversary to the negotiating table by showing resilience in conventional warfare, its infrastructure is largely destroyed, refineries have been hit, and it is struggling to sustain an economy under siege with disrupted daily life. As the war drags on, the burden grows heavier, and uncertainty hinders reconstruction. Therefore, Iran's real test is not on the front lines but in managing the economic and social crisis caused by the destruction. If the electricity grid and oil infrastructure—so far preserved—are targeted, the cost will increase incomparably. Thus, for Tehran, an agreement is not a choice but a necessity. However, it will not agree to such an agreement without securing certain gains from a position it considers advantageous.
This need should not be read as surrender. Despite the 12-day clashes in June 2025 and the killing of most of the leadership, including Iranian leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, the system did not collapse; the administration consolidated around Mojtaba Khamenei. Khamenei’s influence over the Revolutionary Guards, his state experience, and his political connections make him a figure who can both hold the system together and, for that reason, be seen as a critical target.
The system, which survived decapitation and severe damage, perceives the current situation as existential and appears ready to bear high costs. Therefore, although Tehran needs economic compromise, it will not agree to a deal that gives the appearance of surrender. Indeed, this is the main message behind the June 7 attacks.
Washington's situation is also more difficult than it seems. The Strait of Hormuz, closed since the end of February, has constrained oil flow, and the International Energy Agency (IEA) has called it one of the largest supply disruptions in history. Rising prices fuel inflation and threaten growth. Moreover, the main goal of the operation—regime change—has not been achieved, and forcing the strait open is no longer an option. Washington cannot bear this burden indefinitely. In short, only an agreement can open the strait. Since this is Iran’s most effective card, Tehran will not want to open the strait without extracting concessions and guarantees.
Indeed, the parties have been working on such an agreement for some time. A basis for consensus is on the agenda, extending the ceasefire by sixty days and centered on opening Hormuz and lowering energy prices. In return, Iran expects sanctions relief and resources for rebuilding infrastructure. However, the main sticking point in negotiations is the nuclear program. While Washington insists on zero enrichment, Tehran does not give up this right, and a comprehensive agreement is delayed.
Tehran’s Message
This is what makes Iran’s June 7 move significant. With a single move, Tehran sent a message to both Israel and the US, using the violation of its red line for Lebanon as an opportunity to show what it can do if war resumes. Thus, it demonstrates that it is not abandoning Hezbollah, takes ownership of the Lebanese front, blames Israel for undermining the ceasefire, deepens the rift between Trump and Netanyahu, and reminds that if negotiations collapse, the turn will come to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The common implication of these messages is that the cost of prolonging the war will not be limited to Iran but will also affect the global economy. Indeed, the Houthis’ renewed threat to target Israeli shipping in the Red Sea in the same period gives the impression of coordinated messaging within the Iran axis. With Hormuz closed, the only factor restraining global prices is Saudi oil flowing through the Red Sea. If Bab el-Mandeb also closes, this line could collapse. Thus, Iran reminds that if the siege continues, it can expand the war and multiply the costs.
Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon Is Essential for a Lasting Ceasefire
The northern leg of the equation is Lebanon, and the issue is not just Hezbollah. Israel’s ground operation that began in March crossed the Litani River and now controls about one-fifth of the country, reflecting the long-on-paper doctrine of “defensible borders” now implemented on the ground. The evacuation of villages and prevention of resettlement suggest this is a permanent occupation. Since Iran ties the ceasefire to Israel’s withdrawal, the Litani line is a critical threshold for Tehran. Therefore, even if an agreement is reached on Hormuz and the nuclear file, Lebanon will remain a live trigger.
In conclusion, Iran wants to avoid a second wave from the US that would target civilian infrastructure, while the US wants to resolve the Hormuz and nuclear issues without making the war more costly. However, this path is not guaranteed for either side. Worsening deprivation could at some point trigger a major social explosion, or it could centralize the security apparatus and fuel nationalist reflexes, thereby strengthening the regime. Since both sides need a victory narrative, it seems difficult to escape this deadlock without appearing defeated.
Moreover, Israeli security circles are likely to read this fragility as a window of opportunity and continue sabotage and influence operations even while the ceasefire officially holds. It is not unlikely that Iran, having deterred its adversaries and perhaps emerged with some gains, could return to the activities that caused the war in the future. Therefore, from Israel’s perspective, the tendency is growing that Iran’s military, economic, and technological capacity should be broken in the long term, not just temporarily deterred. However, neither global markets, the US, nor the Gulf countries can bear such a cost. This picture has the potential to fuel the tension between Netanyahu’s ambitions and Trump’s predicament. Netanyahu wants to step down not as a “corrupt” and “genocidal” prime minister in domestic politics, but as a leader who “secured Israel’s security” and “eliminated the Iranian threat,” and this expectation conflicts with Trump’s effort to reach a deal as soon as possible.
