Montenegro: Ahead of the EU, Russia, and Croatia's Veto
Montenegro aims to become an EU member by 2028, though this deadline is considered a political ambition rather than a realistic one. Croatia may use its veto due to historical conflicts, and internal political factors and pro-Russian influences could complicate Montenegro's path to European integration.
Montenegro is currently leading the region's European integration efforts. Podgorica has been consistently pursuing this path since 2010, a journey that Ukraine is now attempting to accelerate during the full-scale war.
Montenegro expects to become an EU member as early as 2028, which would breathe new life into the Union's enlargement policy, which has been in a state of suspended animation since 2013. For Ukraine, Moldova, and the rest of the queue, this case serves as a crucial litmus test: whether Brussels is capable of moving beyond words about open doors to actually admitting new members.
Will Podgorica be able to outpace Ukraine in the final stretch? Why is the ambitious 2028 deadline more of a political dream? How might Croatia use historical grievances for diplomatic pressure and "arm-twisting"? And why does a pro-Serbian and pro-Russian "Trojan horse" within the country threaten to repeat the infamous "Bulgarian scenario"? Read the analysis from 24 Channel.
Exclusive comments and explanations were provided by:
- Jovana Marović, former Minister of European Affairs of Montenegro and member of the advisory group "Balkans in Europe";
- Dimitar Keranov, co-founder of the Bulgarian Institute of International Policy.
Montenegro is Closer to the EU Than We Might Imagine
A small, young country in the Western Balkans with a population of just over 600,000 began its journey to the EU almost 20 years ago, shortly after declaring independence in 2006. Negotiations officially started in 2012, but it was only after the start of Russia's war against Ukraine that the EU enlargement process gained momentum due to the political will of EU member states. It turns out this country is currently the most integrated into the European Union among all candidates.
Montenegro's unique experience lies in its monetary policy – long before full membership, the country adopted the euro, as it did not have its own national currency. Formally, this was a unilateral decision without the European Central Bank's approval, so the country cannot print money or influence EU policy. However, in practice, it has completely eliminated currency risks in trade and made transactions extremely convenient.
Furthermore, thanks to this, at the end of 2024, Montenegro officially joined the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), in simple terms, a "financial visa-free" regime. In the autumn of 2025, all local banks will fully transition to the standard for fast and cheap transfers according to European rules. This step has significantly reduced financial and transactional barriers in trade and transfers between Podgorica and the European Union, making the country's economic integration tangible long before its official EU accession.
Additionally, Podgorica's formal indicators also speak to its leading position. Out of 33 negotiation chapters, Montenegro has already closed 18. Separately, unlike neighboring Serbia, Montenegro has fully joined the European Union's sanctions packages against the Russian Federation in response to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Montenegrin government is also actively changing its visa policy according to EU requirements: Montenegro will introduce a visa regime for Russian citizens from November 1, 2026. This has caused considerable outcry in Russia for many months.
Jovana Marović
Former Minister of European Affairs of Montenegro and member of the advisory group "Balkans in Europe"
On the domestic front, with 18 out of 33 chapters currently temporarily closed, the direct focus is on closing the remaining 15 chapters. Although there is a roadmap for completing these closures by the end of the year, and the public administration is making intensive efforts to prepare all necessary documents and fulfill legislative requirements, a huge amount of work still lies ahead.
According to Ms. Marović, politically, Montenegro is currently enjoying a period of strong inter-party consensus with almost one hundred percent parliamentary support for EU-related legislation, with the exception of one right-wing party. However, this momentum faces potential political uncertainty due to the upcoming national elections next year, which will inevitably bring strategic calculations and political shifts until the profile and composition of the new government become clear.
Rule of Law and Russian Spoilers: What Problems Does Montenegro Face on the Path to the EU?
On its path to the EU, Podgorica repeatedly stumbles over the region's classic pitfalls: chronic judicial system issues, corruption, and organized crime. Despite positive reports, the main bottleneck remains the actual practice of the rule of law, where the European Commission still sees deep structural flaws and significant legal vulnerabilities. Add to this the heavy technical artillery, such as "Chapter 27" on ecology and climate – a directive that requires colossal investments, ironclad administrative discipline, and years for the mandatory implementation of European norms.
Jovana Marović
Former Minister of European Affairs of Montenegro and member of the advisory group "Balkans in Europe"
Addressing these bottlenecks requires more than just technical alignment; it demands sustained political commitment to structural implementation. The main challenge lies in transitioning from the formal adoption of laws to demonstrating concrete, verifiable results that meet the European Commission's standards and convince EU member states.
Despite Montenegro's desire to join the EU as soon as possible, Moscow continues to obstruct its progress. Experts assess external influence on the country not as episodic interference, but as a systematic, multi-layered penetration of key state sectors. The former metropolis, Belgrade, invariably serves as the central hub through which the Kremlin projects its destructive influence onto the Balkans.
Dimitar Keranov
Co-founder of the Bulgarian Institute of International Policy
This influence relies on penetration into media, political alignment, and religious networks through the Serbian Orthodox Church. Moreover, Russian citizens own a significant amount of real estate in Montenegro, and Russian tourists consistently form one of the largest tourist groups in the country.
A striking illustration of how this destructive influence is legalized at the highest state level was the behavior of the Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament, Andrija Mandić.
When General Ratko Mladić – former commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, sentenced by the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague to life imprisonment for genocide and war crimes during the Bosnian War (including the Srebrenica massacre) – passed away, Mandić personally and on behalf of his party sent condolences to the war criminal's son. Furthermore, his political allies publicly posted photos of Mladić with slogans like "every Serbian home has its own Ratko."
This crossed a red line for European partners and neighbors. Official Zagreb reacted extremely harshly, as Croatia is highly sensitive to issues of historical memory and war crimes in the Balkans. The Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called such rhetoric unacceptable and contrary to the fundamental values of the European Union. The Speaker of the Croatian Parliament, Gordan Jandroković, directly stated that with such leadership, Montenegro cannot count on Zagreb's support on its path to the EU, given Croatia's veto power as a member state.
Expressing condolences in a public statement by the Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament on the death of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić is extremely inappropriate and condemnable. There is no doubt about that. When the elected head of the highest legislative body of a country aspiring to be part of the European Union (EU) makes such a statement, it is a clear indicator of the principles and policies he promotes," stated Gordan Jandroković.
Although the Montenegrin government tried to distance itself from this incident, assuring European partners that Mandić was speaking only for himself and not on behalf of the entire state course, this incident exposed a key systemic vulnerability. Added to this is a significant "Chinese layer," which is closely intertwined with Russian interests.
A prime example of this was the story of the construction of the Bar-Boljare highway, financed by China's Exim Bank, which created serious risks of debt dependency for the Montenegrin economy.
Dimitar Keranov draws a direct parallel with Bulgaria's experience, which also joined the EU despite inconvenient issues with corruption and the rule of law. Podgorica will most likely follow a similar path, but the real pain and divisions will remain within the country.
Dimitar Keranov
Co-founder of the Bulgarian Institute of International Policy
Montenegro looks good in the context of EU accession because it has implemented reforms and done its homework... But I believe that problems related, for example, to Belgrade's influence, which effectively opens doors and is linked to Russian influence and, more broadly, to Chinese influence – I believe these will remain, and these divisions will persist within Montenegro.
EU Accession in 2 Years: Dream or Possible Reality?
In Montenegro, 2028 is considered a possible date for the country's official accession to the political and economic bloc. Brussels itself acknowledges this and does not dismiss such a possibility. Although the country still needs to close 15 negotiation chapters, the European Union has already begun working on the main document – the Treaty of Accession of Montenegro to the European Union.
In April 2026, the European Union established a special Ad Hoc Working Party to begin drafting the Treaty of Accession for Montenegro.
However, for 2028 to become a reality, we must be honest: if everyone wants to meet the deadline, negotiations should have concluded this year or early next year.
Dimitar Keranov
Co-founder of the Bulgarian Institute of International Policy
Perhaps it would be much wiser to say that negotiations could conclude in 2028. And actual accession would occur in 2029 or 2030. If we say it will happen more or less by 2030, there are some other countries that have chances or at least want to join by 2030. For example, Moldova, Albania, or Ukraine. But I cannot say with certainty whether they will join as a group or individually. It really depends only on how quickly they move.
Jovana Marović emphasizes that it is critically important for Montenegro to maintain its individual accession trajectory and not allow itself to be tied down by the "ballast" of neighboring countries that are hopelessly behind (at least, many believe so). Brussels' attempt to lump the race leader, which has already closed most chapters, into the same category as candidates bogged down by bilateral disputes or constitutional crises, would ultimately kill the very logic of European integration and turn it into a bureaucratic farce.
She also notes that the accession date ultimately depends on the EU itself: how quickly the Union can make decisions and whether they will be blocked by individual EU member states. After all, the enlargement process is traditionally considered more political than technical: a candidate country can only achieve coveted membership if there is political will among all member states.
In practical terms, due to historical disputes, Croatia could potentially impact Montenegro's European integration aspirations. However, even after recent scandals, experts would be more surprised by such a stance from Zagreb.
Dimitar Keranov
Co-founder of the Bulgarian Institute of International Policy
Regarding what I said about Croatia's reaction to Mandić's words, I don't think they will actually use their veto power against Montenegro. I would be very surprised if that happened. I think we are not there yet.
However, there is a legitimate concern within Brussels circles that the enlargement process could be blocked indefinitely if far-right forces win elections in Europe – for example, the presidential elections in France are scheduled for spring next year, and Marine Le Pen is known for her ties to the Russian Federation and holds leading positions in polls.
However, EU enlargement must still happen, as Brussels itself now needs it: the results of the referendum in Iceland have created additional pressure on the EU and its member states, forcing them to demonstrate the convincing success of enlargement policy. Jovana Marović states that in this context, Montenegro is proving to be the main candidate to ensure such success.
For the European Union, Montenegro's accession would indeed be a tool to strengthen its influence in the region and a PR boost demonstrating that the bloc remains viable and desirable for other countries in Europe. Furthermore, a small country would not require significant expenditure – it would cost about three billion euros from the EU's multi-year budget, equivalent to about one euro per EU taxpayer over the entire budget cycle. And if for Montenegro, joining the EU would provide additional economic and geopolitical advantages, then for Ukraine – a country about 44 times larger than Montenegro – it would become the main litmus test: is the EU ready to expand further at all, by accepting at least small countries.
