One Kurdish Peace Deal Could Ignite Another Middle Eastern Conflict
By James Durso - Oct 20, 2026, 2:00 PM CDT
- Former PKK fighters could join Iran’s Kurdish insurgency, strengthening PJAK and threatening to destabilize the Iran–Iraq–Türkiye border region.
- Iraq and Türkiye face growing security risks, as renewed Kurdish militancy could undermine Ankara’s peace process, Iraqi sovereignty, and regional energy infrastructure.
- Washington faces a strategic dilemma, as supporting Kurdish militants against Iran could alienate NATO ally Türkiye and trigger wider regional escalation.
In October 2025, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, Kurdistan Workers' Party) announced it was withdrawing its fighters from Türkiye to northern Iraq as part of a peace effort with Ankara after four decades of hostilities. The statement said all PKK forces in Türkiye were being pulled back to northern Iraq "to avoid clashes or provocations." This followed the group's May 2025 decision to dissolve and a July ceremony where fighters burned their weapons. In late 2025 the PKK also said it had pulled out of the Zap border area in northern Iraq.
The peace process has since slowed. By May 2026, Reuters reported that Türkiye's attempt to end the conflict had stalled, with both sides waiting for the other to act and the U.S.-Israel war on Iran complicating matters. Ankara said the PKK must fully disarm before laws can be enacted to protect or integrate former militants. PKK leaders said the group had "fulfilled its part beyond expectations."
In August 2026, the peace process law was published in Türkiye's Official Gazette and took effect, marking a step forward.
After the PKK announced its dissolution, some observers expected that some of its fighters might transfer to its Iranian branch, the PJAK (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê, Free Life Party of Kurdistan). PJAK issued conflicting statements, on the one hand lauding the PKK’s decision, “This is the right path…” then a week later declaring the group “will neither lay down arms nor dissolve ourselves.”
PJAK is already the most active Iranian Kurdish group, accounting for an estimated 70 percent of confirmed attacks by Iranian Kurdish opposition groups since 2014, though PJAK and Iran negotiated a ceasefire in 2011. In January 2026, however, armed Kurdish groups attempted to cross into Iran from Iraq.
The Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan reportedly has only 2,500 to 10,000 lightly armed fighters, so reinforcements could matter. Even so, these groups may have limited capacity to topple the Iranian regime alone, partly because of rifts between leftist groups such as PJAK and nationalist ones such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, as well as between groups tied to different Iraqi Kurdish political parties. The Washington Post reported in March 2026 that U.S. President Donald Trump offered support to a Kurdish operation in Western Iran, which would complicate matters for Baghdad as it is trying to recover full sovereignty and to disarm and dissolve the Iran-aligned militias.
In April 2026, Trump admitted the U.S. sent weapons to Iranian protesters via the Kurds, who kept them instead. The Kurds vehemently denied Trump’s claim, but Iran will view this as more evidence of Kurdish perfidy – CNN reported in March 2026 the American Central Intelligence Agency was working with Iranian Kurdish groups to “spark an uprising” - and of Baghdad’s inability to control its borders.
Some demobilized fighters may return to Türkiye as civilians, but others may prefer to keep fighting and join a campaign against Iran. Should Kurdish forces take up arms against Tehran, the repercussions would destabilize the Iran–Iraq–Türkiye triangle. The costs would not fall evenly:
For Iraqi Kurdistan
The Kurdistan Region will bear much of the cost. It has already been targeted by Iran and its proxies more than 1,000 times since 28 February 2026, according to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Baghdad and the KRG previously agreed to restrain PJAK. Iranian pressure could split the KRG's two main political parties, the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), since they have different relationships with Tehran. (The PUK is closer to Tehran and the pro-Iran Iraqi militias.)
Tehran has conducted drone and missile strikes on PJAK/PKK-linked positions, framing them as threats to its border. Kurdish fighters moved into Iran in March 2026, and renewed attacks inside Iran (especially in Kurdish-majority provinces such as West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Kermanshah) would raise the likelihood of larger or more frequent Iranian strikes on Iraqi territory, diplomatic demands on Baghdad and Erbil to expel the groups, and possible ground incursions. Iranian officials have already tied stability on their western border to the removal of these “terrorist” bases.
If former PKK fighters began launching significant attacks against Iran, Tehran would have a much stronger justification for attacking their bases. Beyond air and missile strikes, Iran could eventually turn to covert operations and the assassination of Kurdish leaders, a prospect likely to focus minds in Erbil far more than strikes on militant camps.
Erbil is simultaneously trying to satisfy Türkiye by eliminating the PKK's armed presence, keep Baghdad and Washington onside, and preserve relations with Iran while preventing Iranian attacks on Kurdish territory.
Fighters shifting from the PKK to PJAK would force Erbil to make difficult choices.
Ankara would remind Erbil of its pledge to eliminate the PKK, Tehran would accuse it of letting anti-Iranian militants operate from its territory, and Baghdad would cite violations of Iraqi sovereignty. Erbil's reply, that it does not control every Kurdish armed group in the mountains, will satisfy none of them.
For Iraq
Baghdad is currently trying to establish greater control over Iran-aligned militias freely operating on Iraqi territory.
The United States has celebrated the PKK’s disarmament as the first success story for its regional strategy, which seeks to strengthen state institutions and reduce the security vacuums exploited by Iranian non-state actors. A failure of the disarmament could embolden Iraqi militias to resist demobilization, potentially using the continued presence of the PKK in Iraq to justify retaining their weapons. This could complicate Baghdad’s efforts to consolidate its monopoly over the use of force and weaken the broader U.S. objective of strengthening state sovereignty across the region.
The September 2026 Türkiye-Iraq agreement illustrates the trend: Iraq agreed to extend state authority in Sinjar and remove foreign armed elements, while Türkiye agreed to begin withdrawing from its Bashiqa base. A new PKK/PJAK insurgency would undermine that bargain.
A failure of the disarmament could also lead Türkiye, whose influence in Iraq is growing as Iran’s declines, to put its preoccupation with the PKK ahead of its commitments to Baghdad, especially the gradual handover of the Bashiqa base under that agreement. Such a trajectory could push Iraqi–Turkish relations back toward a security-driven agenda.
Baghdad could find itself facing Iranian attacks on its territory, Turkish pressure on the Kurdistan Region, and Kurdish militants operating from Iraqi soil at the same time. That would make the Iraqi government's sovereignty problem substantially harder and threaten oil exports, the government’s economic reform program, US$60 billion in American investment, and infrastructure efforts like the Development Road.
For Türkiye
Ankara's peace process with the PKK would be at risk. Türkiye could claim the group never fully disarmed, and resume strikes in northern Iraq.
Ankara and Tehran have precedent for working together: in 2011 they pledged to collaborate against the PKK and PJAK. If fighters leave for Iran, Ankara might initially read that as the PKK winding down, but it would likely react harshly if it saw a PKK reconstitution.
Türkiye’s official line is that the PKK must fully disarm and that Iraqi soil cannot remain a launchpad for future attacks. If fighters withdrawn from Türkiye were rebranded as PJAK and attack Iran, Ankara could face accusations of bad faith or of exporting the problem, while Iran could demand Turkish cooperation against the shared infrastructure. At the same time, historical rivalry means neither capital fully trusts the other and escalation could complicate energy, trade, and coordination against a resurgence of the Islamic State.
Türkiye has historically regarded both PKK and PJAK as threats, despite PJAK fighting Iran rather than Türkiye, but Ankara’s interests are changing.
Türkiye is currently trying to end the PKK conflict, while simultaneously expanding its strategic and economic relationship with Baghdad and the KRG. Ankara would therefore probably resist any simple rebranding of PKK fighters as PJAK.
Reuters reported in March that Türkiye was already closely monitoring PJAK because of concerns about its activities against Iran. Türkiye's Defense Ministry explicitly said PJAK activity threatened regional stability.
So, Ankara could find itself in the unusual position of cooperating with Iran against former PKK fighters, even while its relationship with Tehran (“cooperative rivalry”) remains complicated. The two compete in Iraq, Syria, and the Caucasus, and support opposing sides in conflicts such as Libya and Yemen, but they share an interest in preventing stronger Kurdish armed movements. Türkiye could supply intelligence on PKK personnel and networks while Iran targeted the resulting PJAK infrastructure, and the two might jointly press Baghdad and Erbil. The PKK peace process could end up producing closer Turkish-Iranian counterinsurgency cooperation if former fighters migrate into the Iranian theater, an outcome that will alarm Tel Aviv that will push Washington to “do something!”
For Iran
Iran would face a more capable Kurdish insurgency. PJAK has historically been considerably smaller and less capable than the PKK, but an influx of experienced PKK commanders, fighters, and support personnel could increase PJAK’s effectiveness and give it access to PKK tunnels, shelters and supply networks in northern Iraq, and potentially greater ability to move fighters across the Iran-Iraq frontier, changing PJAK's capabilities in kind, not just in number.
Under normal circumstances, Iran can probably contain a relatively small PJAK insurgency, but the danger would increase dramatically during an Iranian political crisis.
If Iran simultaneously faced major urban unrest; splits within the IRGC; an economic crisis; renewed Israeli or U.S. military pressure; a Baluch insurgency in the southeast; and a Kurdish insurgency in the northwest, experienced PKK cadres joining PJAK could become disproportionately important.
Iran could respond by cracking down harder on Iranian Kurds inside Iran and portraying the opposition as foreign-backed separatism.
For the United States
The U.S. will face a choice between using the Kurdish groups against Iran and alienating Türkiye, a NATO ally. Long-standing grievances with Tehran, and Israeli pressure, will probably lead Washington to discount Ankara's concerns.
Reuters reported in March 2026 that Iranian Kurdish groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan had discussed military action against Iran with the United States, including attacks on Iranian security forces in western Iran during the U.S.–Israeli war.
That is a volatile combination: Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, PJAK, former PKK personnel, and U.S. intelligence or material support.
But Washington has a major problem: the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and supporting a military structure that includes former PKK personnel could therefore create serious legal and political complications, but Washington will press through them if it feels doing so will end its long-standing grievances with Tehran.
It would also infuriate Türkiye, whose distrust of Washington would peak if Ankara concluded that the U.S. campaign against the Islamic Republic took precedence over the security concerns of a NATO ally.
Finally, the Kurds remember that in February 1991 U.S. President George H.W. Bush urged the Iraqi people, “to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside” but then failed to support the uprising that followed, which ended in widespread killing by the regime and over 1 million Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Iran and Türkiye.
Wider effects
The damage will not be contained inside the Iran-Iraq-Türkiye triangle. Past PJAK attacks have coincided with Iranian crackdowns in the Kurdish provinces and with refugee and fighter flows. Fighters leaving Türkiye may encounter residual Islamic State cells, Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces units, or Syrian Kurdish groups, any of which could turn a border incident into a wider clash.
The likeliest outcome is more regional escalation rather than a decisive military gain, with civilians in the Kurdistan Region and Iraq’s other border areas bearing much of the cost.
