Why Did Russia Suddenly Target the Baltic States?
An international journalistic investigation revealed that these lawsuits are being prepared not only by lawyers but also with the help of propagandists and historians linked to Russian special services. Why is Russia, while continuing the war in Ukraine, paying more attention to the Baltic states? Is this just another information war and psychological pressure campaign? Or are we seeing a consistent legal, diplomatic, and information strategy that could in the future become a pretext for more aggressive Kremlin actions? How should Lithuania respond? This was discussed on the "Žinių radijas" program by Eitvydas Bajarūnas (hereinafter E. B.), representative of the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists in Brussels and former ambassador; Alvydas Medalinskas (hereinafter A. M.), political scientist at Mykolas Romeris University; and Remigijus Motuzas (hereinafter R. M.), Chairman of the Seimas Committee on Foreign Affairs.
– In general, we would like to look at this whole picture today – what is happening with Russia. Why, it seems, are we talking so much now about Russia's difficult situation due to what is happening inside Russia? I'm referring to the fuel crisis. But here, it seems, Russia has decided to refocus on the Baltic states. Is it possible to explain why this intensification has occurred?
– A. M.: Russia is simply returning to the situation that existed in the Russian public space and in the statements of individual politicians or political scientists quite close to the Kremlin before February 24, 2022. At that time, observing this Russian public space, I noticed that negative comments and various interpretations of history were very similar regarding Ukraine and not only Lithuania but all Baltic states. And then I said that most likely Putin had two ideas on the table for what he could do on February 24, 2022: attack Ukraine or attack the Baltic states.
Of course, Putin doesn't need much of this informational, ideological promise when speaking to his own people, but this information is being developed for a much wider world. Now, I think, we are returning to the same thing. Russia sees problems achieving any major victories against Ukraine on the front before the State Duma elections, but the situation with the gasoline shortage is so critical that it shakes Putin's regime – I wouldn't say the foundations, but perhaps the walls or some beams. Putin needs to show that he is strong. What does he show in Ukraine? He is strong. He strikes Ukrainian cities with ballistic missiles, knowing that Ukraine has no anti-ballistic defense, which was discussed yesterday in Paris. He can also show he is strong by launching various information attacks against NATO or EU states, showing that NATO and the EU are not an argument for him. However, to carry out these information attacks, this whole background is being created for both Russian citizens and a wider audience.
What perhaps surprised me more is that now all Baltic states are being accused of the situation of Russian speakers. Previously, the Baltic states were also accused, but it was always said that it didn't affect Lithuania – that more was said about Latvia and Estonia. Now I see that everything is combined. On the other hand, I do not rule out the possibility that Russia may now provoke some incident to which Lithuanian state institutions would have to react, and suddenly it would turn out that it was a Russian speaker or someone else who would complain that their rights are being violated or something similar. Russia can blow such bubbles. So, I think this is preparatory ground for possible further policy, which, of course, the Kremlin would project after the State Duma elections and after the midterm elections in America, speaking about next year.
– Would you see this as preparing the ground for more aggressive actions?
– A.M.: Without a doubt. Again, more aggressive actions can be military, diplomatic, economic – though economic may not mean much here – and informational. Yes, this informational and legal ground is being prepared.
– Mr. Bajarūnas, some talk about this being an excellent time, for example, to organize something against Lithuania because it will hold the EU presidency. Allegedly, this could influence the opinion of Western states – maybe the West will start thinking: "What kind of country is this now presiding over us? Perhaps national minorities are indeed oppressed?" Are those who think this too naive? Or perhaps we, believing that the West has already learned its lessons, are too naive?
– E. B.: Still, I would start with the main statement that supposedly in 2022 the Baltic states and Ukraine were on the table. They never were. Ukraine has always been a separate obsession of Putin. Ukraine is his life's goal, the vision of the current stage, that Ukraine must be swallowed, Russia must dominate, and that these are two nations that supposedly accidentally separated. Therefore, Ukraine is on a completely different level.
Everything we now see happening in the Baltic states is aimed at the same goal – Ukraine. Precisely because at this moment Putin cannot achieve his goals in Ukraine. This was evident not only this year but also earlier. If we consider the first goals – the so-called demilitarization, not to mention the capture of Kyiv in three days – it was clear that it was impossible for Putin to achieve these goals. Now he has already lowered the bar to the capture of Donbas, but it is clear that even that cannot be done. However, Putin thinks differently than we are trying to imagine here. He certainly does not feel like he is losing, at least he does not show it. In pursuit of the same goal – to win victories on the Ukrainian front and achieve what he set out to do, i.e., dominance over Ukraine – currently, not achieving that, he begins to look for other ways – to divert attention and increase pressure on the West. One of those targets is the Baltic states. But let's recall – a week ago there was allegedly leaked data that some provocation against Poland was being prepared. There was news about strengthening bases near the Finnish border.
I think the Baltic states are only part of the whole machine that Putin is turning. It is military, intended for intimidation; it is legal, diplomatic, and also informational, which we are talking about today. Therefore, I would still distinguish categories. Ukraine is Putin's main goal, and we are just a part. Putin never thought of starting a war against the West because he knows that starting a war against the West is something completely different. Yes, of course, we could be bait if a situation arises where a war over Taiwan begins, US attention shifts to the Indo-Pacific region, and a divided Europe cannot concentrate forces. But at the moment, we certainly do not see that. I think the NATO summit confirmed to Putin that such a state of the West is still far off.
But Putin would not be Putin – he will continue to pursue his goals. Obviously, for this purpose, he is using a long-tested tool – Russian speakers in the Baltic states. He is using a tool called intimidation. And here, as I said, the goal is to divide the West, divert attention, again raise doubts so that we ourselves begin to doubt ourselves. Of course, that legal move to the International Court of Justice – those familiar with the specifics of this court know that it is a shot over several years, because a case will be filed, then examined, accepted or not, and this issue can be used to keep the whole propaganda flywheel spinning, which, without a doubt, will be propagandistic. It is no coincidence, as mentioned at the beginning, that Russia hires propagandists and historians to turn that propaganda flywheel.
But Ukraine is a separate matter. This is a signal, and Putin knows very well that he has to talk to the West. Western Europe does not listen to him, so he has to talk to Donald Trump. This sends a signal to Trump that not everything is good in his controlled territory. Allegedly, the Baltic states are not so good in terms of values; they are also mired in various scandals. They supposedly oppress Russian speakers; the term deportation appears, which is extremely resonant. But all those propaganda flywheels, as they spin, must latch onto something. In our countries, undoubtedly, statements by individual politicians will be used that Russian speakers in Lithuania have too many rights, that perhaps we are too liberal in allowing Russian citizens to enter our territory – those who fled the war, opposition people, but Putin and Russian propaganda will also include people living in Belarus and, God forbid, people who came to Lithuania from Eastern Ukraine.
Ukraine has always been a separate obsession of Putin.
– Regarding retaliatory measures, there was a similar narrative. Just to add a bit to Mr. Bajarūnas, when there was the whole situation with drones and Latvia suffered the most from Russia's side, it was said that this was because parliamentary elections were approaching, so Latvia was the first to fall under the Russian whip. But it was also said that if Russia managed to establish the narrative that the Baltic states are contributing to strikes on Russia with Ukrainian drones, then retaliatory actions could be expected. In that case, Russia could sit at the negotiating table because it would have a pretext for responding to the actions of one or another NATO state, but at the same time could manipulate by saying: "If you do not want the Baltic states to face the Ukrainian scenario, let's sit down and talk," thus bargaining for more. Would you see that this is exactly how that scenario was being set up?
– A. M.: Your question allows me to return to the thought I already expressed. So I will simply remind you of what I said earlier. I hold the opinion that Putin's goals have always been at least two. One goal is Ukraine. Another goal is us, but not in the context of Ukraine. We are in the context of the European Union and NATO.
Let me remind you of Putin's ultimatum in December 2021. It did not mention Ukraine at all. It talked about the Baltic states and other countries that became NATO members. Putin frightened the West and said: "Leave these countries in a gray security zone." He demanded that, saw a very weak Western reaction to this ultimatum, but its essence at that time was not Ukraine but the EU and NATO, because his second goal, alongside Ukraine, is to split the European Union or even dismantle the existing security architecture in Europe. Therefore, discussing and presenting a counterargument to E. Bajarūnas, I would say there are two goals.
Why did Putin choose Ukraine? Because both in the West and in Russia it was thought that Ukraine would fight for only a few days. Putin did not get the answer he wanted regarding the maximum plan – the dismantling of European security architecture. He thought he would take Ukraine and then go blackmail the West again to achieve the second goal. If the situation were only about Ukraine, then in all of Putin's historiography that poured out at the end of 2021, there would be no talk about the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, about a weak gentry state, about the Treaty of Revel, the Treaty of Nystad when Russia became an empire, about Peter I, Catherine II, and so on. Nor would there be talk about how the Soviet Union gave Lithuania Klaipėda, Vilnius, and so on. For each state, its own ideological sauce was concocted to show that they are supposedly some unclear states. Look how Kremlin ideologists now most often refer to the Baltic states – lymphotrophs, dwarfs, and other such epithets. He is looking for weak points. Yes, Finland and Poland were also mentioned, but he understands perfectly that Finland is a tough nut. It was a tough nut before World War II and still is, regarding civil defense, preparedness, societal mobilization, and other things. I think the Baltic states are being watched, preparing this ideological sauce. But it is being prepared not only for the Baltic states. The Baltic states can also be tied to the history of the former Soviet Union, the Russian Empire. Putin's interest is to restore the former Soviet Union and so on. However, we are members of the EU and NATO, so the main interest is to shake, find the weakest link in the entire European security architecture and through it shake and continue to blackmail the West.
Returning to the question about drones – it is precisely through the drone topic that this entire Putin information war has linked us to Ukraine. Many things already connect us with Ukraine; Lithuania strongly supports Ukraine, no great intelligence is needed. But now it has been linked again specifically in the context of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the most important thing is how we are presented in that context. Look how Europe is now described by Putin's ideologues. Allegedly, it is almost unfinished Nazism. That is said, for example, about the current active role of Germany in European security architecture and other things. Here we can be placed between the situation with Ukraine – allegedly you allowed Ukraine to do this and that. Another thing – allegedly, since you are very weak, it is most likely not your initiative but an initiative coming from those "bad" European countries. So this is actually a quite dangerous accusation, because if you want to explain why you intend to pursue a more aggressive policy towards one or another state, you have to say that it is attacking me or allowing attacks on me through its territory. Such things have happened in other regions where states said that if someone shoots from your country's territory, you are to blame, not the shooter. The fact is that no one wants to delve into what technologically happened with those drones. In fact, this may have been a weak point. I think it would definitely be necessary to prepare some studies, monographs, regarding those technological diversions – what Russia does, how it intercepts those drones, how it can divert them from course, and other things. Here, I think, is no less important a task for our state, perhaps together with other Baltic states, than for lawyers to now prepare for the possibility that all those legal battles in courts may begin, where the most important thing will not be the court itself but the process. The process itself will be used as an information weapon.
– And in general, we are probably in an unenviable position, looking at the war in Ukraine, precisely because of the Kaliningrad situation. It seems many say that Russia's Achilles' heel is Kaliningrad. The Ukrainians seem to understand that too. But essentially, signals are very clearly transmitted to us from Russia that if you only allow drones to start flying into Kaliningrad, their trajectory going through Lithuanian territory, and you do not shoot down Ukrainian drones, we will take it as a certain contribution. Allegedly, you will have colluded with the Ukrainians to do this. On the other hand, we probably have to ask the Ukrainians that, as a last resort, they think carefully about Kaliningrad, because everything will immediately turn against us. And this is probably the Achilles' heel not only for Russia itself but also for Lithuania in this war in Ukraine.
– E. B.: Ukraine is Putin's most important goal. I certainly agree that the second goal, which he constantly pursues in the long term, is the splitting of the West. This is not only about pressure on us through the courts that are starting now, constant accusations, information wars. Drones very correctly link us. They are trying to lump us together with the Ukrainians. Before that, there were stories about cable cutting.
But imagine – Putin thinks in terms of several years. Next year Marine Le Pen will participate in elections, and he sees that it may well be that NATO unity will no longer be as strong. Trump was quite amenable at this NATO summit because midterm elections are approaching. But what will happen if the Republicans and the MAGA camp win? Such a scenario is possible, and Trump could change his position again. So Putin sees a whole palette of ways to pressure the West. This includes blackening the Baltic states and finding weak spots.
Then I move on to Kaliningrad. The Kaliningrad factor is being actively exploited. And here I certainly would not be among those who bravely say that with a few shots Kaliningrad could be laid flat. Look, we are not the only ones watching Kaliningrad. It is watched by the EU and especially NATO strategists. I remember the beginning of the war, when I was still an ambassador. Kaliningrad seemed unrelated to Russia's 2022 war against Ukraine. But when Lithuania hinted that in this context, with Russia openly at war against Ukraine, we could stop the movement of Russian citizens under the simplified transit procedure, both from the EU and the US, we were told: "Do not do that. Do not open another front." Kaliningrad is like a time bomb. Similarly, if you recall the beginning of Russia's war against Ukraine, there was a situation where the EU banned the export of certain categories of Russian goods to the EU, and Lithuania had started to say that it would not allow these goods to be transported in transit. Again, there was enormous pressure from European capitals and the United States – do not touch this issue. Where am I going with this? To the point that Kaliningrad is not such an object that we can easily say we can lay it flat with a few shots. Russian forces there are quite large; the Russian fleet is stationed there. In the event of war or even a limited conflict, it would certainly not be an easy nut. Especially considering the narrow neck that many political scientists call the Suwałki Corridor, or the Suwałki Gap. This would certainly be one of the main problems.
I think this has already become traditional Russian pressure instruments, and we will see how they are used. Discussions will start, allegedly appearing somewhere, about Russian pressure on Kaliningrad. Later, it will move to the Suwałki Corridor. Then the court topic discussed at the beginning of our conversation will reappear. All these mechanisms show that Russia is simply returning to its already tested pressure measures against the Baltic states, NATO, and the EU. As Alvydas very correctly formulated, all this is done to achieve the same long-term goal – to split the European Union.
– Mr. Motuzas, we are talking about why Russia now seems to be more actively paying attention to the Baltic states. We are also discussing the lawsuits that are being prepared. Allegedly, some lawsuits will be filed with the International Court of Justice regarding the deportation or discrimination of Russian speakers. Let's start with those lawsuits. What is the reaction of our politicians and how do we view this? Are we clearly trying to explain in NATO and the EU that this is completely untrue? Or are we reacting less to the lawsuits that may appear?
– R. M.: Probably the answer should be both yes and no. In fact, we should probably pay less attention because we understand that this is a deliberate process. Russia itself does not have facts to find and create those stories, so propagandists were hired for such lawsuits. However, on the other hand, we cannot not react. I think it is very good that the European Parliament supported us, as well as the High Representative Kaja Kallas and others. We must talk about it. I think these processes are very strongly linked. Russia is indeed experiencing desperation now. We know that Lithuania borders the Kaliningrad region. Russia, seeing how certain parts of its territory are attacked with drones, became very concerned about the Kaliningrad region. A month ago, a certain doctrine was even raised that the Kaliningrad region could be blockaded; the governor was summoned, etc. Naturally, the thought arises that we are a neighboring state next to the Kaliningrad region, so a version was concocted that Ukrainians could attack the Kaliningrad region from Lithuanian territory. Not only Lithuania was accused of this – Latvia was also strongly accused of allegedly allowing Ukrainians to use its territory. I think these are propaganda goals related to a situation of desperation.
Out of habit, being a former diplomat in Russia, I still look at their networks, social channels, official information, Interfax, and other sources. In fact, the population is increasingly asking. They say: "It was supposed to be a planned military operation, and now we are suffering. Our daily life has changed; we are being attacked; we have no gasoline, social guarantees; we cannot leave due to visas and other things." When we asked diplomats what people think in the public space, they would say: "We have been used to suffering for centuries; for centuries we have been attacked; for centuries the West, America, etc., have despised us." All this helps maintain the image of a besieged fortress, helps justify the war in Ukraine, and unite Russian society.
– Regarding Kaliningrad, you used the past tense. One can recall the story when, I suppose, all the highest officials of the country reacted and explained that there really are no plans or similar actions that Russia talks about, allegedly drones can be launched from Lithuanian territory. Now, looking at the whole situation, we see that recently Latvia has been getting more flak. Would you say that we have somehow managed to stop that propaganda?
– R. M.: I think only partly. We must be vigilant. It is already an open secret, and Russia itself does not hide it, that it has a list of certain sensitive infrastructure projects both in Lithuania and other Baltic countries. We must also be prepared for that. The Kaliningrad region will always be used for that. Even now, processes have not calmed down there – it continues to be escalated that they can be attacked, blockaded, or otherwise affected. All this is done to maintain constant tension and, of course, to be able to blame us for ties with Ukraine or support for Ukraine, allowing it to use our territory. These processes we are talking about are known to us from history. Those various pretexts have been successfully used more than once to launch attacks. We know examples from the Balkans, the Caucasus, and other states – such pretexts became reasons for attacks or war.
– So you would see that all this could somehow develop to the point where Russia tries to attack the Baltic states?
– R. M.: I think that will not happen, but we must be vigilant. Russia is provoking it. Perhaps it will not be such an attack that we would call a full-scale assault, but we must be prepared that certain infrastructure projects and similar objects could be attacked. They have not forgotten, say, how we disconnected from gas; the LNG terminal is a thorn in their side. That is one example of such infrastructure projects; we must be very careful, vigilant, learn from our past, and certainly not succumb to any provocations.
– And regarding those lawsuits, would we see the possibility of also filing some counterclaim with the International Court of Justice in response to what Russia is preparing?
– R. M.: At the moment, I do not know the exact procedure, but of course, when the processes get moving, the UN Court itself will ask us to explain this process. But at the current stage, I think we really should not react, especially since, as our local Russians say – these days I saw on social networks, Pavel Lauriniec, who is a prominent cultural center director, docent at the university, and so on, says that it is not Russia but Lithuania that has ruined the lives of Russians here. Russia has ruined our lives. In fact, because of the attack on Ukraine and other things, it often happens that Russian speakers are afraid to admit they are Russian or to speak Russian and so on. This is indeed a very good summary – Russia has ruined the lives of Russians living in the Baltic states by its brutal actions.
This radio program was subtitled using artificial intelligence. It is not yet perfect, so we apologize for any inaccuracies or errors in the subtitles.
