On July 3, US President Donald Trump delivered a speech at Mount Rushmore in South Dakota to commemorate the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States. The speech began with American independence, the Constitution, freedom, and faith, but then abruptly shifted into an intense "anti-communist" narrative. He called communism a deadly threat to American freedom, the greatest threat facing the United States, exceeding even the two world wars, Pearl Harbor, and the September 11 attacks. Trump did not name China or directly attack the ruling Chinese Communist Party, but that is precisely what makes the speech interesting: on the surface, it attacks "communism," but in reality, it targets the Democratic Party's left wing, democratic socialists, immigration policy, and the midterm elections. However, in American political communication, the word "communism" carries Cold War memories and associations with China, making it easy for China to be drawn into the fray.
I. Trump's sword is aimed at "communism"
If understood in the Chinese political context, Trump's speech could easily be interpreted as a new round of ideological attacks by the US president against socialist countries and communist party systems. This judgment is not entirely wrong, but stopping at that level would miss the true focus of the speech.
Trump indeed used extreme language in this address. He said that at the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States, American identity is under attack again, and the "communist threat" is resurging on American soil. He said this is not just ordinary political disagreement over taxes or regulations, but a "deadly threat" to American freedom. He said: "You either pledge allegiance to Karl Marx or to America; you are either a communist or a patriot—you cannot be both." These words sound like a Cold War mobilization manifesto, but it is first and foremost not a foreign policy document—it is the language of electoral politics.
The key is that Trump's use of "communism" here is not the version found in a political economics textbook, nor is it a strictly theoretical concept of Marxism. It is more like a big bag in American right-wing political discourse, into which can be stuffed democratic socialism, progressivism, identity politics, lax immigration policies, left-wing campus culture, welfare state advocacy, radical environmentalism, and virtually any political agenda that does not align with Trump-style conservatism.
This is also an old tradition in American politics: when electoral competition enters a war of values, concepts cease to be concepts and become labels; labels are no longer used to explain the world but to divide friend from foe. When Trump talks about "communism," it is not to debate "Das Kapital" with anyone, but to tell voters that the Democratic left is not an ordinary opponent but an enemy that will destroy America.
This is directly related to the current domestic political background in the United States. In recent years, democratic socialists have become more active in local politics in places like New York and Colorado, with some candidates gaining support from younger voters and ethnic minorities. For Trump and the Republican Party, this is excellent political material. Labeling the Democratic left as "communists" can simultaneously attack three types of targets: first, the radical wing within the Democratic Party; second, the Democratic establishment, which Republicans portray as indulging the radicals; and third, moderate voters worried about inflation, immigration, public safety, and cultural issues.
Therefore, the first layer of meaning in this speech is domestic. Standing before Mount Rushmore, Trump used the historical symbols of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt to place himself in the dramatic scene of "defending the spirit of America's founding"; then, by invoking the old enemy of "communism," he packaged the 2026 midterm elections as a battle to defend the spirit of 1776. This is not a misuse of history but a deliberate transformation of history into a campaign stage.
II. Aiming at the Democratic Party: "Communism" is a box into which all enemies are placed
The most telling part of Trump's speech is not his critique of how evil communism is, but his immediate pivot after saying "America will never become a communist country" to the midterm elections, the Senate filibuster rule, and the Save America Act. He said that if the Republicans "end the filibuster" and pass the bill immediately, the Republicans "would never lose an election for a hundred years"; he then claimed that the so-called "communist party" consists of illegal immigrants, criminals, and all those who do not want to work. This jump is very abrupt but precisely reveals the true structure of the speech: ideology is just a shell; electoral rules are the core.
In other words, Trump does not first discuss communism and then touch on elections; rather, he first has an electoral need and then pulls out communism as a target. The Democratic Party can be described as condoning illegal immigration, progressives as hating American history, and democratic socialists as agents of communism. Once these lines are connected, Trump's political narrative is complete: America is not engaged in normal two-party competition but is facing an internal subversion.
This is precisely the "pointing at the mulberry while cursing the locust" tactic. The "mulberry" in Trump's mouth is communism; the real "locust" he wants to hit is the Democratic Party. In real American politics, the "Communist Party" is not a force capable of influencing a general election, but "communism" as a fear symbol still possesses strong mobilizing power. It can awaken Cold War memories, stir up religious conservatives, unite anti-immigrant voters, and simplify complex social issues into a single enemy.
For Trump, this term is especially useful. It is more frightening than "leftist," more archaic than "socialism," and better suited for creating hostility than "Democratic Party." It can attack economic policy as well as cultural issues; it can criticize campus movements as well as immigration policy; it can say opponents do not love America as well as that they betray God. Thus, a word with a clear theoretical meaning is transformed into a universal enemy in American electoral communication.
But this tactic has a side effect: it cannot be strictly confined to the domestic sphere. America's "anti-communist" discourse has always carried international political echoes. During the Cold War, it referred to the Soviet Union; during the Vietnam War, it referred to revolution in Asia; today, although it is often used to attack the Democratic left, it inevitably brings China into the background. Trump may not name China, but his audience, the media, members of Congress, think tanks, and allies may not be so restrained.
This is why China gets "collateral damage." This speech is not a policy declaration specifically targeting China, nor can it simply be interpreted as the US launching a new war of systems against China. But in the American context, once "communism" is reactivated, it naturally slides toward issues like a hardline stance on China, technology decoupling, investment review, scrutiny of international students, pandemic origins, and supply chain security. There is no firewall between American domestic political vocabulary and foreign policy tools. The ghost of McCarthy has never departed.
III. China need not rush to take a seat, but cannot underestimate spillover
For Chinese readers, the most important thing in understanding this speech is to avoid two extremes.
One extreme is to directly associate every mention of "communism" by Trump with China. This would overestimate the speech's China focus and actively fall into the friend-enemy framework Trump has set. In fact, from the text, he is primarily talking about the resurgence of the "communist threat" within the United States, focusing on the Democratic left, immigration, electoral rules, and American identity—his direct target is not China. The other extreme is to see it as mere "election rhetoric" within the US, having nothing to do with China, and thus feel complacent. This is also dangerous because discourse in American politics, once repeated, often solidifies into policy pressure.
Many hardline agendas in US policy toward China do not always start with cold strategic documents; they often begin with heated electoral language. Candidates first say China is a threat at rallies, the media turns it into an issue, members of Congress introduce bills, and the executive branch converts it into reviews, sanctions, bans, and funding. By that point, the initial campaign rhetoric has become policy reality.
The danger of Trump's speech is not that it immediately changes US-China relations, but that it provides new emotional fuel for future policy spillover. If the Republican Party continues to use "anti-communism" to rally its base in the midterm elections, members of Congress may compete to add more China-related issues; conservative media may further weave China, immigration, the pandemic, technological security, and American decline into a single story; allies may also face stronger pressure to take sides based on values.
For US-China relations, this trend is particularly detrimental. There are already technological, trade, security, and geopolitical competitions between the two countries. If the old narrative of "liberalism vs. communism" is added to the mix, disagreements shift from conflicts of interest to conflicts of identity. Conflicts of interest can be negotiated; conflicts of identity are more easily absolutized. Trump's speech framed the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States as a battle for America's soul. If China is pulled into this script, the space for rational US-China relations will further shrink.
Therefore, China's response should not be simply to counterattack or to remain silent. A more appropriate approach is to deconstruct this discourse: first, point out that it primarily serves US domestic elections and is a political tool for Trump to attack the Democratic left; second, explain that "communism" in the American conservative context has been highly generalized and cannot be simply equated with the theoretical concept of communism in the Chinese context or with real socialist countries; third, remind the international community to be vigilant that polarization in US domestic politics is dragging international relations back into ideological interpretations.
In a sense, Trump's Mount Rushmore speech is like a mirror. What it reflects is not the real power of communism in America, but the anxieties of American politics itself: identity anxiety, cultural anxiety, electoral anxiety, and anxiety over decline. Trump has labeled all these anxieties as "communism" and then cast himself as the guardian of America's founding spirit.
But words have their own fate; once uttered, they slip out of the speaker's control. If "communism" becomes the universal enemy in American politics again, it will not stop at the Democratic Party. China does not need to take a seat voluntarily, but it must recognize whether the "seat" has been arranged and designed by others. That is what Beijing should watch most carefully about this speech.
(Note: Wang Peng is a researcher at the National Governance Institute of Huazhong University of Science and Technology. This article represents the author's personal views only.)
