Yusuf Zainal: Gulf Arbitration Evolves from Marginal to Strategic Choice

First Secretary-General of Gulf Arbitration

Yusuf Zainal Opens His Files to "Al-Bilad": Arbitration in the Gulf Has Transitioned from a Marginal Culture to a Strategic Choice

Monday, June 29, 2026

Omar Al-Kaabneh | Photography: Khalil Ibrahim

• Bahrain is not a surprise in the rankings... but a result of a long legislative path.
• My relationship with law began in Moscow... and my thesis on foreign investment was ahead of its time.
• Hormuz is an international strait... not a canal subject to transit fees.
• Electronic arbitration and artificial intelligence have changed the rules of practice.
• Iran's failure to ratify the Law of the Sea does not exempt it from customary international law.
• Maritime law opened my eyes to private and public international law.
• Parliamentary work is closer to my heart... and in the depths of my being.
• Law gives discipline to politics... and politics gives law horizon.
• Bahraini arbitration needs legislative updates to keep pace with the times.

From Moscow to Malmö and Malta, from international law halls to commercial arbitration platforms and the Bahraini parliament, the journey of Yusuf Zainal extends across Gulf experiences that combined legal thought, institutional practice, and public service.

In this exclusive interview with "Al-Bilad", the first Secretary-General of the Commercial Arbitration Center for the Gulf Cooperation Council states opens pages from his career spanning more than four decades. He speaks about his academic beginnings in the Soviet era, how studying international law led him to specialize in maritime law and international commercial arbitration, before moving into institutional and legislative decision-making in Bahrain.

The interview addresses transformations in Gulf arbitration, Bahrain's position on the map of international dispute resolution centers, his vision for new legal challenges related to technology and international navigation, and his recollection of his parliamentary experience, which he considers closest to his heart... Here is the text of the interview:

Who is Yusuf Zainal? How did your journey in law and arbitration begin?

My direct relationship with law began when I enrolled in 1971 to study at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University, Faculty of Law in Moscow during the Soviet era. My master's thesis in international law (equivalent to a bachelor's plus a higher diploma) at the time was about foreign investment—a topic not widely discussed then, especially in Soviet circles, which approached it with caution due to Marxist-Leninist ideological orientations. After that, I returned home to offer the legal knowledge I gained from that university, which provided qualified cadres from Third World countries to help build their nations emerging from colonial control.

Circumstances led me to a job opportunity in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, at the Arab Academy for Maritime Transport, one of the specialized organizations of the Arab League. My connection to maritime law came after enrolling at the World Maritime University in Malmö, southern Sweden, in 1983–1985 for a Master's in Maritime Administration, which opened my eyes to private and public international maritime law. I didn't stop there; after working as a lecturer in maritime law and maritime safety at the Academy for four years, I felt a strong desire for extensive study of private and public international maritime law. So I was sent to study in Malta at the International Maritime Law Institute, covering both its branches, earning a second Master's in International Maritime Law in 1990. My academic and professional career after graduating from Malta became tied to maritime law: I continued teaching at the Academy, then moved to work at the United Arab Shipping Company in Dubai and Kuwait, holding various prestigious positions. After about four years at the company, I returned to Bahrain after being selected as Secretary-General of the Commercial Arbitration Center for the Gulf Cooperation Council states in January 1995.

More than three decades as an international arbitrator since 1992—what has changed in this field?

Much has changed during the late millennium and early current millennium. Arbitration was in its early stages in Bahrain and all GCC states. There were no independent legislations regulating commercial arbitration across the Council states; civil procedure laws regulated arbitration in separate sections. For example, in Bahrain, the Civil and Commercial Procedure Law of 1971 dedicated Chapter Seven to arbitration (Articles 223–243). There were no specialized arbitration centers in Bahrain or other GCC states. To give credit where it's due, Bahrain emerged as the first state to establish a commercial arbitration center in 1993 (Bahrain International Commercial Arbitration Center in December 1993), followed by centers in Dubai and then Abu Dhabi in 1994. Chambers of commerce and industry handled disputes among members and others through their arbitration and settlement committees.

Arbitration culture was very low, necessitating conferences, courses, and workshops to spread arbitration culture in the region. Similarly, courts in all GCC and Arab states were unfriendly and unsympathetic to arbitration, except for judicial intervention in arbitration procedures. All these matters are now history.

The major transformations in GCC states in arbitration since 1992 can be summarized at four levels:

First—Legislative transformation: Most Gulf states moved from traditional arbitration laws linked to procedural laws to independent laws based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. Notably, Bahrain issued its first independent arbitration law in 1993 based on the first Model Law of 1985, followed by Arbitration Law No. 9 of 2015 adopting the 2006 amended version.

Second—Institutional transformation: Specialized regional arbitration centers emerged, such as the GCC Commercial Arbitration Center (GCCCAC), Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution (BCDR), DIAC in Dubai, ADCCAC then ADGM-ICC in Abu Dhabi, SCCA in Riyadh, QICCA in Qatar, and in Oman and Kuwait.

Third—Cultural transformation: Arbitration moved from being a rare option regarded with suspicion by governments and companies, especially after the Aramco and Abu Dhabi arbitrations, to becoming the default contractual choice in major commercial and investment contracts.

Fourth—Technical transformation: Electronic arbitration, virtual sessions, and artificial intelligence in case management and document analysis have radically changed the nature of practice, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic.

You combined law, commercial arbitration, and parliamentary work... Which is closer to your heart?

Of course, without hesitation, I say parliamentary work is closer to my heart and in the depths of my being. For the record, I have participated in all parliamentary elections in the Kingdom of Bahrain since 2002, through 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018, up to 2022. I love parliamentary work, where I found my calling, combining politics, legislation, and oversight.

This trio is not competitive but complementary. Maritime law was the academic and specialized gateway, arbitration was the practical field where legal skill in dispute resolution manifests, and parliamentary work is the space that allows a legal professional to create the law, not just apply it. Many legal professionals describe parliament as the "creative side" of the profession, while arbitration is the "craft side."

What is the most difficult arbitration case you handled?

Arbitrators usually classify the most difficult cases based on three criteria:

• Technical complexity: Cases intertwining complex maritime, engineering, or financial legal issues.
• Legal complexity: Multiple parties, multiple applicable laws, jurisdictional conflicts.
• Political sensitivity: Cases involving sovereign parties or government companies.

In the Bahraini and Gulf context, historically the most difficult disputes have been in the sectors of major contracting, energy, and maritime shipping in all its branches.

On a personal level, I have participated in numerous arbitration cases as an arbitrator (sole arbitrator, presiding arbitrator, co-arbitrator, and counsel for one of the parties) in Bahrain, the UAE, South Korea, and elsewhere. The strangest and most difficult was the case filed by a Bahraini merchant against a well-known South Korean company. The oddity was that the contract was old—20 years or more before the dispute arose—and the paper it was written on was almost worn out. We managed to photocopy and clarify the contract clauses written in English, where the arbitration clause stipulated arbitration in South Korea under the rules of the South Korean arbitration center. Those rules required arbitration before the center's tribunals in the Korean language and before arbitrators chosen by the center from South Korean nationality (the situation later changed to allow arbitration in other languages like English).

In the end, the tribunal and its presiding arbitrator were largely fair, and our client received over 70% of the claim amounts. The main difficulty was the Korean language, which the tribunal and the Korean party spoke, with the translator providing simultaneous interpretation into English. We had to convey our submissions to both parties through an interpreter, and we were never fully certain of the accuracy and correctness of the translation to and from Korean!

Bahrain's Position in International Arbitration

Bahrain has topped specialized international reports as a pro-arbitration judicial environment... In your opinion, what factors led the Kingdom to this position, and is it a temporary achievement or a result of a long legislative and institutional path?

Bahrain has topped specialized international reports as a pro-arbitration jurisdiction—a great development, not a surprise, but a culmination of a long path that began with the following steps and actions:

1. Early accession to the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in April 1988.
2. Establishment of the Bahrain International Commercial Arbitration Center in December 1993, later transformed into the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution (BCDR-AAA) in 2009 in partnership with the American Arbitration Association.
3. Adoption of Arbitration Law No. 9 of 2015 based on the UNCITRAL Model Law of 2006.
4. Establishment of a specialized enforcement circuit in the courts to enforce foreign and arbitral awards.

The achievement is not a "gift" but the fruit of a conscious judicial policy that sees arbitration as a contributor to investment attractiveness. Bahrain's geographical location between the Saudi, Emirati, Qatari, and Kuwaiti markets gives it a competitive advantage as a "neutral station" for dispute resolution.

92% Rejection of Applications to Set Aside Arbitral Awards: Strength or Leniency?

The high percentage of rejection of annulment applications is an indicator of strength, not leniency, provided it is read in its correct context:

• Leniency would mean accepting defective awards, which does not happen because Bahraini courts apply the strict criteria exclusively in Article 34 of the Arbitration Law (in line with UNCITRAL).
• Strength means courts respect the principle of separation between the roles of arbitrator and judge (principle of minimal curial intervention), the golden principle in pro-arbitration judicial systems.

Minimal judicial intervention is what puts countries like Singapore, Switzerland, and France at the forefront of arbitration centers. Bahrain's high rejection rate places it in this category, not in the category of lenient states.

High Number of Annulment Applications Compared to Singapore and Hong Kong

This reading requires careful deconstruction to avoid misleading conclusions:

What the number does not mean:

• It does not mean that arbitration awards in Bahrain are of lower quality.
• It does not mean the legal system is more fragile.

What it actually means:

• High arbitration activity: Annulment applications can only be filed if awards are issued; thus the number indicates a vibrant arbitration market in Bahrain.
• Easy access to courts: Bahraini procedures are flexible and relatively inexpensive, encouraging losing parties to try.
• A litigation culture still maturing: Some parties use annulment as a tool to delay enforcement, a phenomenon faced by all emerging centers.

The real criterion is not the number of annulment applications but their acceptance rate. With 92% rejection, the high number of applications actually testifies in favor of the system, not against it.

Evaluation of Arbitration Law No. 9 of 2015

Strengths:

• Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in its 2006 version means international legislative compatibility that reassures foreign investors.
• Establishment of a specialized judicial circuit in the Court of Cassation to hear arbitration appeals.
• Expansion of the scope of "international arbitration" with clear criteria.
• Adoption of interim measures issued by arbitral tribunals.

Gaps requiring updating:

1. Electronic arbitration and virtual sessions: The law does not explicitly address them, yet they are now essential after COVID-19.
2. Third-party funding of arbitration proceedings: No regulatory framework for such funding by banks and financial institutions, while Singapore, Hong Kong, and Western countries have adopted it.
3. Arbitration in smart contracts and cryptocurrencies: A clear legislative gap requiring rapid legislative treatment.
4. Data protection and confidentiality: Under new data protection laws (e.g., Bahrain Law No. 30/2018), the relationship between arbitration confidentiality and data protection needs adjustment.
5. Multi-party arbitration and joinder/consolidation of third parties: Needs more detailed treatment.

Does Bahrain Compete with Dubai and Abu Dhabi?

The question assumes a zero-sum competition, but the Gulf arbitration market is large enough for everyone, each with its position. As clarified in the following table:

Center Competitive Advantage

• Dubai (DIAC + DIFC): Largest case volume, two legal systems (civil + common law, DIFC).
• Abu Dhabi (ADGM): Integrated common law environment, English-speaking courts.
• Bahrain (BCDR): Neutrality, lower cost, longest legislative history.
• Riyadh (SCCA): Saudi market size and massive caseload.

Bahrain's position: It does not compete with Dubai in volume but offers a neutral, low-cost, high-quality arbitration model, suitable for a certain category of disputes, particularly medium-sized regional ones. Its advantage also lies in its courts being civil-based, so it does not require a free zone with a dual system.

Since its establishment with Bahrain as its headquarters in 1995, the Commercial Arbitration Center for the Gulf Cooperation Council has played founding roles in the Gulf legal system... How do you assess today the Center's impact in building an arbitration culture regionally, and what does it need to regain its position as a primary center for cross-border commercial dispute resolution?

The Commercial Arbitration Center for the Gulf Cooperation Council states, headquartered in Bahrain since 1995, has played founding roles:

1. Unifying Gulf reference: Its rules can serve as the reference framework for disputes between parties from GCC states.
2. Training and qualification: Large numbers of Gulf arbitrators have graduated from its programs.
3. Disseminating arbitration culture: Conferences, publications, and specialized journals.
4. Enforcement of awards within GCC states: Its awards benefit from GCC judicial cooperation agreements.

The Center's current position: It faces a competitive challenge from major national centers like DIAC, BCDR, SCCA, and ADGM. It needs to reposition as a center for cross-border Gulf disputes specifically. It requires:

1. Activating its regional role in commercial arbitration and implementing its competencies related to the Unified Economic Agreement, which has not been activated since its inception in 1995.
2. The Center's system issued in 1993 and its arbitration rules urgently need amendment and updating to keep pace with developments in international commercial arbitration, particularly the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration and Mediation.
3. Promoting the Center as an arbitration center rather than intensifying training/educational activities, so it is not said that the Center has turned into a training center.
4. Chambers should ensure the appointment of qualified legal professionals to the Board of Directors as much as possible, as this reflects on the Board's performance in handling legal/arbitration matters.
5. Not viewing the Center as a commercial profit unit but as a judicial institution serving the private sector in GCC states. Any development should serve this direction, not profitability at the expense of legal justice.
6. Considering strict controls regarding the Secretary-General's roles in appointing arbitrators if parties fail to appoint them, as well as appointing the presiding arbitrator if the co-arbitrators cannot agree, adopting best international practices, and giving the Board of Directors a greater role in supervising the Secretary-General's performance, especially in arbitration matters.

Third Axis: Strait of Hormuz between International Law and Politics

Iran is preparing a 12-clause draft law to regulate navigation in Hormuz. Does this project have any basis in international law?

The Iranian draft law of 12 clauses is an attempt by a coastal state to "regulate" navigation in an international strait unilaterally, facing a fundamental legal problem.

The proposed Iranian draft law to regulate navigation in the Strait of Hormuz (which includes clauses imposing financial fees, requiring prior permits, and barring passage of ships from certain states) has no basis in contemporary international law. Instead, it represents a clear violation of established rules governing international waterways.

From a purely maritime legal perspective, these clauses lack international support based on the following:

1. Nature of the waterway: A natural international strait, not an artificial canal. Tehran, in its legal philosophy for the draft law, attempts to liken the Strait of Hormuz to the Suez or Panama Canals to legitimize imposing transit fees and inspections.

Response in international law: This analogy is legally invalid. Artificial canals are dug and maintained with infrastructure and investments by states within their sovereign territory, governed by special agreements (e.g., the Constantinople Convention for Suez). The Strait of Hormuz is a natural geographical international strait connecting a part of the high seas (Gulf of Oman) to another part (Arabian Gulf), thus subject to rules on international straits, not canals.

2. Transit passage regime: According to Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982), the Strait of Hormuz is subject to the regime of "transit passage." This regime grants all ships (commercial and warships) the right of continuous and expeditious passage without any obstacles, prior authorization, or payment of fees for transit. Article 44 of the Convention emphasizes that strait states shall not suspend or hamper transit passage for any reason.

3. Iranian interpretive loophole and customary law: Iran always argues that it signed the 1982 Convention but did not ratify it, thus considering itself not bound by the transit passage regime, and instead demands application of the older "innocent passage" regime (under the 1958 Geneva Convention), which grants the coastal state broader powers to protect its security.

Legal response: The International Court of Justice and the international community have established that freedom of navigation in international straits has become customary international law binding on all states, whether or not they have ratified the Convention. In the famous "Corfu Channel" case, the ICJ affirmed that a coastal state cannot prevent or condition passage in international straits in peacetime.

4. Illegality of imposing fees and discrimination between ships: The Iranian draft includes clauses for imposing transit fees (to be paid in currencies like the Chinese yuan) and banning ships of hostile states. International rules prohibit imposing any taxes or fees merely for "passage" through territorial waters or straits, except for specific services actually rendered to the ship (such as pilotage or salvage upon request). Additionally, banning ships of a particular state constitutes illegal discrimination violating the principle of global maritime trade freedom.

• Position of other littoral states and the international community: The Strait of Hormuz is not an exclusively Iranian waterway; it is a shared passage, with its territorial waters shared with Oman. Therefore, any unilateral legislation by Iran to manage the entire strait constitutes an infringement on the sovereign rights of Oman, a fellow strait state. The international community (through draft UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII) moves to consider any obstruction of navigation in Hormuz as a direct threat to international peace and security, stripping any legal legitimacy Tehran might claim for this project.

Consequently, a unilateral Iranian project of 12 clauses to regulate navigation in Hormuz has no basis in customary or treaty international law, except within the limits allowed by Articles 41 and 42 mentioned above and their conditions.

Difference between "transit passage" and "innocent passage"

Aspect	Innocent Passage	Transit Passage
Scope	Territorial sea generally	Straits used for international navigation
Legal basis	UNCLOS Articles 17-26	UNCLOS Articles 37-44
Suspension	May be temporarily suspended for security reasons (Art. 25/3)	Cannot be suspended at all (Art. 44)
Submarines	Must surface and show flag	May pass submerged in normal mode
Aircraft	No right to overfly	Right to overfly the strait
Warships	Doctrinal dispute	Explicit right to pass

Why is this difference essential in the case of Hormuz?

Because Iran insists the strait should be subject to the innocent passage regime (which gives it broader restrictive powers), while the established international legal position (held by most states) is that Hormuz is an international strait subject to the right of transit passage, which cannot be suspended, requires no prior authorization, and allows no fees.

Iran's signature of UNCLOS without ratification

The Iranian position has three legal levels:

First level—Good faith obligation: Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 obliges a signatory state not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty before ratification. Thus, Iran is not entirely free from UNCLOS constraints merely by not ratifying.

Second level—Customary international law: Many UNCLOS rules, especially regarding freedom of navigation and transit passage, have become binding customary rules for all states, even non-parties. The ICJ has affirmed this approach in several rulings.

Third level—Iran's interpretive declaration: Iran issued an interpretation upon signature limiting transit passage to states parties to the Convention only, an interpretation rejected by the vast majority of states and international scholars because it contradicts the essential nature of transit passage as a general right.

Conclusion: Iran's position is legally weak; non-ratification does not exempt it from customary law rules, and its interpretative declaration has no authority over other states.

Can the Hormuz file be submitted to international arbitration?

Theoretically yes, practically very difficult.

Possible channels:

1. International Court of Justice (ICJ): Requires Iran's consent, which is unlikely.
2. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): Competent for disputes concerning UNCLOS, but Iran is not a ratifying party.
3. Arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS: Only available to states parties to the Convention.
4. Ad hoc arbitration: Requires explicit agreement among all parties, which is nearly impossible from Iran.

Who has legal standing?

• Coastal states of the strait: Oman and Iran (co-strait state), UAE (partially).
• Affected states: Any state whose flag ship is prevented or hampered in navigation.
• Oil-importing states, in the context of protecting their vital interests.
• The Gulf Cooperation Council as a directly concerned regional organization, and its states located on the Arabian Gulf have legal standing individually or collectively.

Biggest obstacle: Absence of Iran's consent to jurisdiction, a fundamental condition in all international judicial settlement mechanisms.

Evaluation of the Bahraini draft resolution in the Security Council

Bahrain's submission of a draft resolution to protect freedom of navigation is a smart, legally and politically calculated step for several reasons:

1. Internationalization under Chapter VI (pacific settlement of disputes): Places the matter in an international legal framework rather than a bilateral one.
2. Reminder of customary rule: A Security Council resolution reaffirms that freedom of navigation is a shared international interest, not a single state's interest.
3. Legal cover for subsequent moves: Any resolution issued becomes an international reference to rely upon when needed.
4. Highlighting Bahrain's position: Bahrain moves as a Gulf voice directly concerned with navigational security.

Challenge: Russian and Chinese veto power limits the resolution's ability to pass in its binding form, but even a presidential statement or non-binding resolution achieves part of the legal and political goal.

Hormuz legally vs. Suez Canal and Panama Canal:

Aspect	Strait of Hormuz	Suez Canal	Panama Canal
Nature	Natural sea strait	Artificial canal	Artificial canal
Legal regime	UNCLOS transit passage	Constantinople Convention 1888	Panama-US Treaty 1977
Sovereignty	Shared (Iran-Oman)	Full Egyptian sovereignty	Full Panamanian sovereignty
Fees	Not permissible	Chargeable for passage	Chargeable for passage
Suspension of passage	Prohibited	Prohibited by Constantinople Convention	Prohibited

Essential difference: Artificial canals are subject to the sovereignty of the state that dug and built them, but they have committed to international treaties ensuring freedom of passage. Natural straits, however, were not "created" by the coastal state; they exist naturally, so its authority over them is limited by nature and does not include imposing fees or prior permission. Thus, Iran's attempt to regulate Hormuz as if it were a canal under full sovereignty is a legal confusion between two completely different regimes.

Parliamentary Term

First experience in 2002

Context: The first legislative term 2002–2006 came after the referendum on the National Action Charter (2001) and the declaration of transformation into a constitutional monarchy. It was a foundational parliament by all standards:

• Establishing internal regulations.
• Building the relationship with the government and the Shura Council.
• Opening long-accumulated legislative files since the suspension of parliamentary life.

The first experience is always a mix of enthusiasm and discovery, especially for a legal professional like me entering parliament and finding the difference between pleading before a court (focusing on an existing text) and legislative work (creating the text itself).

Utilizing legal expertise in the Legislative and Legal Affairs Committee

The Legislative and Legal Affairs Committee is the backbone of any parliament, as every draft law passes through it for constitutional and legal scrutiny. A professional legal expert in it provides:

1. Reviewing the constitutional compatibility of projects.
2. Avoiding conflicts between legislations.
3. Precise technical drafting (a purely legal skill).
4. Assessing practical effects and avoiding gaps that appear during implementation.
5. Compatibility with international obligations (here the expertise of a specialist in international law and arbitration specifically emerges).

The most important law or proposal in the parliamentary career

Usually, a legal parliamentarian takes pride in laws that:

• Established a legislative infrastructure for a new sector.
• Protected a fundamental right.
• Bridged a known legal gap.

In the Bahraini context during the first and fifth legislative terms (2002–2006 and 2018–2022), you dealt with many pivotal laws in areas: competition protection, trade, financial market, judiciary and public prosecution, maritime law, environmental law, criminal procedure, amendments to the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry law, and other legislation. Contributing to any of these is worth highlighting.

Of course, the first legislative term was a foundational one, where many royal decrees awaited us, including the internal regulations of the Council of Representatives and the Shura Council separately. Since decrees cannot be amended, we worked on making amendments to some decrees like the regulations as previously mentioned. Also, the issue of the judiciary and the importance of the complete independence of the Public Prosecution from the authority of the Minister of Justice, as a person representing the administrative apparatus (executive authority), was necessary. I am honored to be one of the adopters of the proposed amendment so that the minister has no role in the work of the Public Prosecution. The amendment was welcomed and encouraged by the judicial authorities and the Public Prosecution under the chairmanship of Sheikh Jaber Al Khalifa, may God have mercy on him.

I also worked with great enthusiasm with my fellow deputies to pass decrees and laws concerning the establishment of public institutions to complete the frameworks of bodies related to the constitutional monarchy, such as the Constitutional Court, the Public Prosecution, the Financial and Administrative Audit Authority, the Tenders and Auctions Authority, and others. As a specialist in public and private maritime law, I had the honor of participating in the deliberations on discussing and approving the draft maritime law and environmental law, coordinating with the relevant committee in the Council and the Minister of Energy and Environment to bring the two laws to light.

Legislative gaps in the Bahraini arbitration system

From a neutral legal perspective, the most prominent gaps that a parliamentarian specialized in arbitration could work on:

1. Unified law for arbitration in administrative disputes (government contract disputes).
2. Regulation of third-party funding of arbitration proceedings.
3. Legal framework for mediation that integrates with arbitration.
4. Governance of the arbitrator profession: registration conditions, ethics, civil liability of the arbitrator.
5. Arbitration in family and personal status cases: scope and limits.
6. Electronic arbitration: independent regulation or amendments to Law 9/2015.
7. Protecting arbitration confidentiality in an explicit legislative form, not just contractual.
8. Arbitration in labor disputes and activating labor law provisions in this regard and making necessary amendments.

Return to parliament in 2018

What differs between 2002 and 2018:

• Institutional maturity: The 2018 parliament is a stable parliament with traditions and legislative memory, unlike the foundational parliament.
• Economic challenges: Pressure of fiscal reform and VAT.
• Regional file: Tensions with Iran, the Qatar crisis (2017–2021), the Yemen file.
• Digital transformation: Data protection legislation, crypto assets, artificial intelligence.
• Relationship with international institutions: Reforms related to FATF and trade agreements.

Returning after a long absence gives one a rare comparative perspective; they see what has developed and what hasn't, what of previous promises has been achieved and what hasn't.

For someone who combines legal and political work

Valuable professional advice:

First—Ethical separation: The legal professional serves their client faithfully, and the politician serves the voter faithfully; the two interests may conflict. Mental and ethical separation between the two roles is not a luxury but a necessity.

Second—Leveraging integration: Law gives politics discipline and precision, and politics gives law horizon and awareness of social reality. A legal legislator writes a better text because they know how texts will be applied.

Third—Caution against conflict of interest: A client's file with a government entity must not intersect with a legislative position overseeing that entity. Declaring the conflict and abstaining from voting is a necessary professional practice.

Fourth—Continuous learning: Both fields evolve rapidly. A legal professional who stopped at the texts of the past decade and a politician who stopped at the speeches of the past decade are both out of the game.

Fifth—Intellectual humility: Parliament is a school in humility; a skilled legal professional in their specialty may find themselves voting on an agricultural budget or housing policy, learning that specialized knowledge does not exempt from the need to listen to other experts.

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