The bells of the 618 promotion have not yet rung, but the smoke of e-commerce warfare is already弥漫.
On the evening of May 30, JD.com's 618 will fully kick off. However, on the eve of this critical juncture, a WeChat Moments post unexpectedly brought another side of e-commerce competition to the forefront—according to a post by a JD.com insider, they encountered a traffic giant platform manipulating public opinion behind the scenes, demanding that merchants and media publicly criticize JD.com in exchange for traffic support.
As of now, JD.com has not made an official response to the relevant rumors.
JD.com's accusations continue to ferment on media and social platforms, and no response from other platforms has been seen yet. However, the tension between e-commerce platforms did not start with this 618.
In the past few years, e-commerce platforms have engaged in direct competition in multiple tracks such as local life, e-commerce live streaming, and instant retail. As the most important consumption node in the first half of the year, 618 naturally becomes the focal point of contention. Although the momentum of this year's 618 tends to be subdued, low prices remain the key competitive focus of major platforms.
The biggest strategic adjustment of JD.com's 618 this year is the cancellation of the long-standing pre-sale phase. In the past, the pre-sale model was a standard tactic for e-commerce platforms to extend the promotion cycle and lock in consumer spending expectations. Consumers paid a deposit in advance, and platforms requested goods from brands based on order volume, reducing inventory risk while creating a sense of ceremony for the promotion. However, the side effects were equally obvious: complex rules, long waits, frequent refunds, greatly diminishing the user experience. JD.com chose to cut pre-sales this 618, directly selling in stock, paired with the subsidy strategy of "good and cheap," with a clear intention—to use certainty to combat uncertainty. Against the backdrop of weak consumer recovery, consumers are more inclined to immediate gratification.
JD.com, which proposed "good and cheap," not only fully launched its billion-dollar subsidy in March this year but also shouted the slogan "JD is enough to save" for this 618. JD.com CEO Xu Ran also proposed that in the sinking market strategy, JD.com will focus on "extreme low prices" and "rich supply side," saying, "In the future period, we will focus on 'saving' and 'more,' further reaching a wide range of incremental users in the sinking market by establishing a low-price mindset."
Also in May this year, Liu Peng, president of the Tmall Group's brand business development center, publicly stated, "All consumers, regardless of high or low income, are very concerned about price. Price power is a very important thing for us to operate in various traffic fields."
This year, Tmall canceled the official pre-sale, replacing it with direct stock sales starting at 8 p.m. on May 20; it also greatly simplified the discount rules, mainly promoting the cross-store full discount of "300 minus 50," reducing consumers' calculation costs. These adjustments are clearly a reflection on the "complex rules that dissuade users" of the past few years.
In addition, Pinduoduo also emphasized this year to "continue to create the most preferential 618 in history."
The 618 strategies of various platforms, while apparently revolving around "low prices," each have different underlying logics.
JD.com bets on supply chain efficiency and fulfillment certainty; Douyin bets on content ecology and algorithmic distribution capabilities; Tmall bets on brand resources and user mindset; Pinduoduo bets on extreme cost performance and the sinking market. These paths have no absolute superiority but determine their different postures during the big promotion.
When the price war reaches its extreme, competition has shifted from overt price wars and subsidy wars to deeper public opinion wars and resource allocation wars. Beneath the surface of the glamorous 618, the game between platforms has become much more complex.
This precisely reflects the common anxiety of the industry—when all platforms are telling the story of "low price," low price itself is no longer a differentiating advantage but becomes an infrastructure. The real competition thus shifts to places invisible to consumers: who can control the cost structure, who can maintain a healthier merchant ecosystem in traffic distribution, and who can hold their narrative position in the public opinion arena.
This change has also reshaped the relationship between platforms and merchants. In the early days of e-commerce promotions, platforms were rule-makers, merchants were rule-executors, and consumers were passive recipients. Now, the three-party game is subtly shifting—merchants have become more sensitive to traffic costs, consumers have stronger judgment of price authenticity, and platforms must find a new balance between "subsidies for growth" and "profitability for health." The smoke of 618 still lingers, but the form of war is already very different from ten years ago. (Author: Xie Xuan, Editor: Yang Lin)
