Liputan6.com, Jakarta - The case of the resignation or "forced resignation" of the Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes (Jampidsus) Febrie Adriansyah cannot be read solely as a personal event, but as a symptom of power relations among law enforcers that shows the fragility of governance of authority in corruption eradication. In the circulating narrative, Febrie initially asserted that he would continue handling three major cases, then news of his resignation emerged after Polri raids in various locations, and even developed into an issue of naming him a suspect; at this point, the main issue is not merely whether the news is true or false, but what the administrative state significance of this series of events is.
Beginning of the Narrative and Its Meaning
Febrie's statement that he still received orders to prioritize and complete cases shows that the Jampidsus position is not an ordinary position, but a strategic position in the legal enforcement administration system. The media also reported that he stated he would not resign on July 10, 2026, while the Attorney General's Office (Kejagung) later confirmed the existence of a resignation letter on July 11, 2026. In the perspective of state administrative law, a change in official status like this must be seen as an administrative action or consequence that has implications for the position of a government organ, not just a media drama.
More importantly, the Polri raids were linked to several major corruption cases that had been handled by the prosecutor's office, so the public perceived tension between law enforcement agencies. Febrie himself was known for handling major cases such as Jiwasraya, Asabri, BTS 4G, tin, Garuda Indonesia, and other cases involving large state losses. Therefore, when raids occurred at locations associated with him, public perception quickly shifted from "law enforcement" to "institutional resistance."
Position and Authority
In the prosecutor's structure, Jampidsus is a leadership element responsible to the Attorney General and exercises the prosecutor's authority in the field of special crimes. The prosecutor's organizational documents affirm that this field indeed carries the functions of investigation, inquiry, and prosecution in certain cases that are state priorities. That is, the Jampidsus position is not only administrative but also operationally powerful because it directly interacts with the direction of case handling policy.
From the perspective of state administrative law, a public office like this must be subject to the principles of legality, legal certainty, accuracy, non-abuse of authority, and accountability. Therefore, the resignation of an official should not be understood as merely a "political exit," but must be assessed whether it was a voluntary decision, structural pressure, or a result of a situation that made the objectivity of the position difficult to maintain. If the resignation was triggered by strong external pressure, then the legal issue shifts to the realm of abuse of institutional circumstances.
The Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) provides a basis for investigators to conduct raids with certain conditions, including a court warrant under normal circumstances, and a reporting mechanism if the action is taken in an emergency. Polri also has the authority to investigate, raid, and confiscate according to police laws. So, normatively, Polri's actions are not automatically wrong just because the target is a prosecutor's official.
However, state administrative law does not stop at the question "is there authority," but also asks "is that authority used proportionally, objectively, and non-discriminatorily." If the raid was carried out at a time when jurisdictional disputes or conflicts between apparatuses were sensitive, then the standard of accountability must be higher, because an action that is formally valid can still be materially problematic if it creates a selective or intimidating impression. This is the point where the public begins to see the possibility of "mutual hostage-taking of cases."
Resignation, Pressure, and Discretion
Resignation of an official in state administrative law is essentially a personal legal action that affects a public office. But for strategic officials, resignation is rarely completely free from institutional context. If an official chooses to resign after a raid targeting him or his close environment, then it must be asked whether the decision is an expression of administrative freedom, a strategy to defuse conflict, or a form of compliance with invisible pressure.
In administrative literature, discretion must not become a tool of compromise that sacrifices the integrity of the office. If someone resigns so that legal process can proceed without accusations of conflict of interest, that can be read as an ethical step. But if resignation occurs because of a threat of institutional retaliation, then what is actually being damaged is the principle of independence of state organs. In this context, "being named a suspect" must also be distinguished between rumors, investigation information, and legal facts that have been tested; administrative law demands caution so that state officials are not punished through opinion before there is a final procedural basis.
Relationship between the Prosecutor's Office and Polri
Normatively, Polri and the prosecutor's office have interrelated but different working spaces. Polri plays a role in investigation and inquiry, while the prosecutor's office receives case files, conducts prosecution, and under certain conditions also has investigative authority for certain cases. Because there is an overlap in functions at the investigation stage, their relationship easily leads to institutional competition if coordination is not maintained.
Academic studies show that Polri, the prosecutor's office, and the KPK all have roles in corruption eradication, but with different characteristics of authority. In practice, this difference often goes unnoticed because all operate in the same public space: gathering evidence, detention, raids, and media coverage. Consequently, when one institution touches the leadership of another institution, the public easily reads the event as a "counterattack," not as a normal legal process.
The main problem in this case is a crisis of inter-institutional trust layered with blurred public perception. When a Jampidsus handling major cases suddenly faces investigative actions that touch him, the public will ask whether this is pure law enforcement or part of a power struggle. State administrative law teaches that legitimacy is not sufficiently born from authority, but also from the way authority is exercised.
In such a situation, "resigned or forced to resign" becomes a sociologically valid question, although juridically the answer must be determined by formal documents and procedures. If there was indeed a resignation, then the basis, effective date, and administrative consequences must be ensured. If not, then the issue shows how institutional information can be used as a tool of pressure before legal facts are established.
Future Improvements
To avoid the impression of mutual hostage-taking of cases, the relationship between the prosecutor's office and Polri needs to be restructured through a more assertive and measurable coordination mechanism. First, there must be standard cross-institutional protocols for strategic corruption cases, especially those involving law enforcement officials, so that investigative actions that touch other institutions must go through ethics forums and special coordination. Second, transparency of SPDP (Notice of Commencement of Investigation), raids, and confiscations must be strengthened so that the public can distinguish legitimate legal actions from institutional maneuvers.
Third, the division of authority focus needs to be clarified: Polri should be more consistent on general investigations and corruption cases within the reach of the law, while the prosecutor's office should be given a more sterile working space in prosecution and certain investigations without non-procedural intervention. Fourth, external oversight mechanisms through the National Police Commission (Kompolnas), the Prosecution Commission (Komjak), the DPR, and if necessary, an independent institutional ethics audit must be strengthened to oversee cases that intersect between institutions. Fifth, an institutional ethics must be built that conflicts between law enforcers should not be publicized as a power contest, but resolved within the corridors of law and accountability.
From a state administrative perspective, the Febrie Adriansyah case shows that public office in law enforcement is very vulnerable to becoming a battlefield between authority, integrity, and public perception. Resigned or forced to resign is not just a matter of personal position, but a symbol of the quality of inter-institutional governance: whether law is truly enforced as a service to justice, or becomes a tool of reciprocal pressure. If the relationship between the prosecutor's office and Polri is not fixed, then corruption eradication will continue to be shrouded in suspicion of mutual locking, not mutual strengthening.
