The CIA Announces Russian Attacks to Fuel War Propaganda
According to a report obtained by El Mundo from Lithuanian sources, Moscow is preparing attacks in the Mediterranean while three countries go to the polls in 2027
Francesco Ciotti
By now, the more astute know: the first victim of war is truth.
Only in a climate of propaganda and fear can fertile ground be found to drag peoples into an abyss without end, where all future is bartered for rearmament, transforming the Erasmus of future generations into permanent military service. The future is bartered for a non-future.
And so, intelligence agencies from across the ocean are now fueling fear.
According to a CIA report, based on Lithuanian sources, a new front could even open in the Mediterranean Sea in the war in Ukraine. The information, gathered by US services and shared with some European governments, concerns a drone operation that Moscow is reportedly considering against Spain, France, or Italy.
The newspaper reconstructs the origin of the alarm from CIA Director John Ratcliffe's trip to Moscow on August 25. Ratcliffe reportedly arrived in the Russian capital on an American military plane that had stopped in Riga. No public meetings were held in Latvia, but a diplomatic source from a Baltic country cited by El Mundo claims that local authorities were informed in advance of the trip and subsequently of its content. The Wall Street Journal and Politico had already reported in the following days that the mission was linked to a warning addressed to Moscow against possible attacks or provocations against NATO.
The Gerbera Drone and the Technical Scenario
The aircraft indicated by the information in the possession of Lithuanian authorities is reportedly the Gerbera, a Russian-made drone that first appeared on the Ukrainian battlefields in July 2024 and has since been used in several incidents beyond the conflict's borders. Its dimensions are modest: about two meters in length, a wingspan of 2.5 meters, a maximum weight of 18 kilograms, a cruising speed close to 160 kilometers per hour, and a declared range of 600 kilometers, varying based on payload and flight conditions.
The hypothesized scenario involves these drones being transported on merchant ships, hidden inside containers, and launched from international waters via catapult systems, a simpler launch method than that required for larger drones. According to a source close to the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, from a distance of 200 or 300 kilometers from the coast, a flight to a European target would take approximately between one hour and a quarter and two hours, depending on the aircraft's actual speed. The objective of such an operation, according to the Spanish newspaper's sources, would not necessarily be large-scale destruction, but rather a political and economic effect: demonstrating Russia's capability to strike in European rear areas, fueling insecurity and divisions within NATO.
Reactions from Involved Governments
However, the general alarm was quickly met with skepticism, even in Rome. Defense Minister Guido Crosetto publicly denied the alarm raised by El Mundo, writing on X that the hypothesis of attacks against Italy, Spain, and France by Russian ships and drones finds no confirmation and serves no one, calling it fuel on the fire in an already difficult and tense moment. Qualified sources contacted by Ansa added that the alleged alert has not reached any operational level, neither intelligence, diplomatic, nor military, contributing to a picture of strong Italian institutional skepticism regarding the Spanish reconstruction.
Even the US Ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, had previously urged caution, rejecting claims that Russia directly threatens the Atlantic Alliance. Whitaker stated that the Secretary General, the North Atlantic Council ambassadors, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe are monitoring the situation but warned that moving towards escalation serves no one's interests and that an excessive reaction to hybrid activities would be exactly what adversaries expect.
Denials from Baltic and Finnish Intelligence
The most significant data emerging in the same weeks paradoxically comes from those who should be most exposed to a potential Russian threat. The annual report of the Estonian foreign intelligence service, published in February 2026, stated that Russia has no intention of launching a military attack against any NATO state, neither in the current year nor the next, while continuing to rapidly rebuild its military capabilities in response to European rearmament. Director General Kaupo Rosin stated that there is no reason for panic at the moment, adding that Europe must continue to invest in defense precisely so that Moscow concludes it has no chance against the Alliance countries.
A similar assessment came even from Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly stated that he sees no evidence of an imminent Russian military escalation against Finland or any other NATO country, while maintaining high vigilance along the Alliance's longest border with Russia.
On the opposite side, Russian representative to the OSCE Dmitry Polyansky reversed the narrative, claiming that it is the European political elites who are fueling a climate of military hysteria in preparation for a direct confrontation with Moscow, acting, in his opinion, against the will of their citizens who favor peace.
After all, from which pulpit does the information note come? Precisely from that agency that works tirelessly to kill Russians. According to Defense News, US intelligence sharing with Kyiv has returned to full capacity, a development that coincided with the intensification of Ukrainian medium and long-range attacks against the Russian oil industry; cooperation between the CIA and Ukrainian intelligence services, the publication recalls, has been continuous since 2014. An investigation by The New York Times reconstructed how it maintained and extended its covert support throughout 2025, even at times when official Pentagon military assistance remained frozen. This detail becomes even more significant considering that, according to reports from both Reuters and The Washington Post, in March 2025, the United States had decided on a total suspension of information exchange with Kyiv: the CIA, evidently, found channels to continue its support activities anyway.
Hybrid Warfare and German Rearmament
It is evident how the specter of Russian hybrid warfare is today the most favored tool to push the continent towards rearmament and a conflict no longer merely hypothetical. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated in recent days that the Alliance has all the necessary options to respond to threats attributed to Russia, some visible to the public and others not, arguing that the most effective response would be to increase, not reduce, military support to Kyiv. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz described the situation as particularly serious, stating that it might only be weeks or months before freedom and peace in Europe are defended, and linking his words to the incident of an explosive-laden drone detected at Leipzig-Halle airport, an event that reportedly contributed to the German decision to close the Russian Consulate General in Bonn.
On the eastern front, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski proposed more intense and aggressive NATO exercises around the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, believing that military pressure could force Moscow to shift forces from the Ukrainian front. Sikorski added that, in the event of a Russian attack on Poland and an unrestricted NATO conflict, the Alliance would win quite quickly due to its air superiority. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys escalated further, evoking the possibility that NATO could demonstrate its ability to penetrate the small fortress of Kaliningrad and, if necessary, raze the air and missile defense bases present in the enclave, a hypothesis that some Russian commentators consider a possible red line with very serious consequences.
This climate of growing tension is accompanied by unprecedented German rearmament in the history of the Federal Republic. Summing up the ordinary budget, the special fund for the Bundeswehr, and military aid to Kyiv, Germany's total defense spending reaches approximately 108.2 billion euros in 2026 and 133 billion in 2027, equivalent to 3.1 percent of GDP, with the stated goal of reaching 3.5 percent by the end of the decade. On March 18, 2025, the Bundestag amended Articles 109 and 115 of the Basic Law with 513 votes in favor, excluding from the constitutional debt brake all defense and security spending exceeding 1 percent of GDP, approximately 44 billion euros per year. In addition, there are two special funds of 500 billion euros each, one for the Bundeswehr and one for infrastructure, while the 2026 federal budget foresees approximately 180 billion euros in new borrowing, the second highest level in German post-war history after the pandemic.
On April 22, 2026, Germany published its first true military strategy, signed by Chief of the General Staff Carsten Breuer, structured in three phases: maximum operational readiness by 2029, substantial capability growth by 2035, and technological superiority by 2039. The stated goal of Chancellor Merz is to build the strongest conventional army in Europe; Berlin has already deployed the first brigade permanently stationed abroad since 1945 in Lithuania, which is expected to number 5,000 men by 2027. On the industrial front, the 2026 budget allocates about 15 billion euros for ammunition alone, while military procurement spending increases by 16.8 billion euros, reaching about 27 percent of the total defense budget. In the 2027 budget, one euro out of five for armament spending will be allocated to direct purchases, although analysts from the think tank Bruegel point out that Germany's real limitation is no longer the willingness to spend, but the slowness of a procurement system that is still fragmented and bureaucratically conservative.
According to documents cited by Politico, Germany intends to allocate nearly 3.4 billion euros to the purchase of US Typhon systems and Tomahawk cruise missiles, considered by Berlin a deterrent against Russia. However, the program presents several critical issues: the first deliveries may not arrive until the early thirties, and the cost of the systems would exceed initial estimates, leading Berlin to consider them a transitional solution pending the development of autonomous European missile capabilities.
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Francesco Ciotti
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