“Eisenkot” and “Netanyahu”: Recycling Issues and Preserving Image, While Palestinians Are Left Out
As the Zionist elections scheduled for this autumn approach, the political situation in the occupation state is witnessing an unprecedented shift. Since the founding of the “Yashar” party in September 2025, the party led by former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot has been ahead of Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party in opinion polls.
Repeated and frequent polls show Yashar leading by a narrow majority, while other polls show Eisenkot personally ahead of Netanyahu as the preferred candidate for prime minister. However, a close reading of the two men’s positions reveals that this fierce competition does not herald a fundamental change in the Israeli trajectory, and the Palestinians will not benefit from it in any way.
Intersecting, Not Opposing Paths
Eisenkot’s rise stems from a personal and political background that differs from Netanyahu’s in form, not substance. The man who led the occupation army in the 2014 war on Gaza, and who lost his son in the war of genocide on Gaza, has not deviated from the security Zionist consensus.
Eisenkot, who supported the military campaign on Gaza, withdrew from Netanyahu’s government over a disagreement on the management of the war, not its essence. He called for a ceasefire and an exchange deal, while Netanyahu insisted on continuing, meaning the point of divergence was tactical, revolving around how to end the war at the least cost, not whether the war was legitimate in the first place. Thus, the Palestinians in this equation are an absent party, not one taken into account.
Specialist in Israeli affairs Ali al-A’war confirms that the basic difference between Benjamin Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot does not relate to the essence of the Zionist project toward the Palestinian people, but rather to the method of managing this project and the tools for its implementation.
Al-A’war, in a special interview with the Palestine Information Center correspondent, stresses that the difference between the two men is only in discourse. While Netanyahu wants to manage the Palestinian issue through decisiveness, annexation, and dismantling, Eisenkot may resort to containment, security arrangements, and partial political tracks. This means it will not necessarily be a radical shift in favor of the Palestinians.
He says: “Netanyahu represents a right-wing ideological current that seeks to settle the conflict and impose facts on the ground by force, relying clearly on extremist religious and nationalist parties, settlement expansion, gradual annexation, weakening the Palestinian Authority, and preventing the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.”
In contrast, al-A’war sees that “Eisenkot belongs to the Israeli security-military school, presenting himself as a more realistic and institutional figure, less subject to extortion by extremist parties,” adding that he does not represent a leftist or pro-Palestinian rights current, “but rather a security Israeli center that believes conflict management must be conducted in a way that preserves Israeli interests and prevents the occupation from becoming a security, political, and international burden.”
Al-A’war believes that the chances of reaching an agreement with Gaza might be greater under Eisenkot compared to Netanyahu, because Netanyahu used the continuation of the war as a tool to maintain his political coalition and delay his accountability for the events of October 7, he says.
Eisenkot’s position does not stem from a different or ethical stance; according to al-A’war, he sees ending the war or reducing its intensity as necessary to rebuild the army and society, end the reserve crisis, repair relations with the United States and European countries, and open the door to new regional arrangements.
Al-A’war adds that negotiations under Eisenkot will remain governed by Israeli security conditions, foremost among them disarming the resistance, preventing its return to power, and imposing long-term security control over the Strip. This means the chances of reaching an agreement may change, but the content of the agreement will remain difficult for Palestinians if it does not rest on a unified Palestinian position and real Arab and international pressure.
Regarding the so-called “two-state solution,” al-A’war expects that “Eisenkot may stop Netanyahu and his government’s rush to kill it definitively, but he will not necessarily be able or willing to turn it into a political reality.”
He believes the term “two-state solution” may return to diplomatic and political discourse, especially under pressure from the United States, the European Union, and Arab countries, without implying an actual Israeli decision to implement it.
Al-A’war said: “Eisenkot does not present himself as a supporter of establishing an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, but talks about separation from the Palestinians, maintaining a Jewish majority, long-term security arrangements, and a regional path that guarantees Israeli interests.”
He believes that “Eisenkot may accept a phased political track, or a limited Palestinian entity with restricted powers and disarmed, or a regional plan that includes reforming the Palestinian Authority and expanding the role of Arab countries, but he will face broad internal opposition to any major withdrawal from the West Bank or division of Jerusalem.”
Change for Image’s Sake Only
Eisenkot is attributed a degree of “moderation” that enables him to attract Zionist voters worried about the influence of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. But the concern here is specific: worry about extremism that distorts the occupation state’s image internationally and strains its relations with Washington, not rejection of the settlement project or annexation of more West Bank land.
Eisenkot has never, at any point in his military or political career, proposed a project that equates settlers with Palestinian citizens or recognizes a Palestinian national right. The limits of his “moderation” are the limits of the traditional Likud in the era of Sharon and Barak: smart management of the occupation, not its end.
Al-A’war expects a decline in the level of open political support for settlers, a reduction of some illegal outposts according to Israeli law, and a curtailment of the powers of figures like Smotrich and Ben-Gvir if a centrist government is formed.
He sees a possibility that an Eisenkot government would treat settler attacks more seriously, as they harm the occupation state’s international image and create security problems for the army, and might stop some of the most provocative settlement decisions, especially if they hinder relations with the US administration or European countries.
He denied the possibility of a comprehensive halt to settlement, saying: “Settlement did not start with Netanyahu; it is a state policy adopted by various Israeli governments for decades. Eisenkot may differentiate between the major settlement blocs he wants to keep and isolated outposts that he might use as a card in any political settlement. So we may see a slowdown in some projects or their reorganization, but not a dismantling of the settlement project.”
Jerusalem: A Point of Consensus
The issue of Jerusalem is among the files where it is difficult to expect a fundamental change, due to broad consensus within Zionist parties, from right to center, on considering Jerusalem as the unified capital of the Zionist entity.
Al-A’war says: “Eisenkot may differ from Netanyahu in the level of allowing extremist religious groups to storm Al-Aqsa Mosque or change the status quo there, because he realizes that these measures could explode into a wide Palestinian and regional confrontation. He may seek to control the movements of extremist ministers and settlers, reduce public provocations, and maintain coordination with Jordan and the United States.”
But al-A’war adds that this does not mean Eisenkot will accept dividing Jerusalem or immediately recognizing East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state. He said: “His policy may be more cautious and less provocative, but it will remain based on entrenching Israeli control, continuing Judaization and settlement projects in less noisy forms.”
A Dead End
In short, what the rise of Eisenkot presents, in its apparent simplicity, is an opportunity for the occupation state to recycle its ruling elite under the guise of renewal. But the structure of disagreement between him and Netanyahu remains detailed: managing a ceasefire vs. continuing war, calmer rhetoric toward Washington vs. open confrontation, quiet ongoing settlement, and Jerusalem continuing to suffer with less noise.
In each of these items, the Palestinian question, as a matter of rights, sovereignty, and citizenship, remains absent from the core of the program. Therefore, any expectation that removing Netanyahu will automatically open a better horizon for Palestinians is not based on any evidence in Eisenkot’s public positions or record.
The upcoming Zionist elections, in other words, are an Israeli referendum on Netanyahu, not on the Israeli path toward the Palestinians—that path which, no matter how the faces change, remains fixed in its basic axis.
