NATO Eastern Flank Audit Reveals Readiness Gaps Despite Spending Pledges

Italian marines during Exercise Nordic Response, where NATO practiced defending its eastern border in cold-weather conditions.Photo: Jonathan Nackstrand / AFP / Scanpix

NATO Eastern Flank Military Readiness Audit Points to Significant Gaps Among Ten Border States

Evelyn KaldojaChief Foreign Editor at Postimees

16th June 2026, 19:58

Pledges to raise defense spending alone do not automatically produce deployable units, tank-capable bridges, or rapid decisions when a crisis breaks out, concludes GLOBSEC’s recent defense capability audit, "Annual Battle Readiness on the Eastern Flank”.

In the audit report, the Prague-based GLOBSEC think tank assessed the current state of national defense among ten NATO eastern-flank allies: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

In addition to traditional factors such as defense spending as a share of GDP, the size and equipment levels of the armed forces, logistical capacity to bring in reinforcements from the West, and the domestic defense industry, the report also examined each country’s political readiness to face war.

According to the report, the political dimension of readiness is an essential part of national security. It includes national consensus, public trust, institutional responsiveness, and societal resilience, and it shapes the broader strategic environment in which military power is built and used.

Considerable Variation

GLOBSEC researchers point out that national consensus — the degree to which a country agrees on foreign-policy objectives and its defense posture — varies significantly across the eastern flank. It depends on different nations’ historical experience, threat perception, and domestic politics.

The report notes that countries with direct experience of Soviet occupation or recent Russian aggression, especially the Baltic states and Poland, tend to show much stronger cross-party support for a robust defense policy.

That broad national consensus, in turn, provides a stable environment for long-term defense planning and investment. The events of 2022 also shifted public consensus in Finland and Sweden toward a greater sense of urgency on security; in their case, after decades as neutral states, this meant a rapid decision to join NATO.

Military personnel available to NATO allies on the eastern flank.Photo: GLOBSEC REPORT

GLOBSEC’s analysis adds that some other eastern-flank countries periodically experience political fragmentation on defense issues. Election cycles can make defense commitments less stable, while populist or Russia-leaning political forces sometimes question NATO priorities or defense spending.

According to the audit, NATO’s entire eastern flank is characterized by greater-than-European-average trust in NATO and in national armed forces. Still, there is considerable variation here as well: Poles have the highest level of trust in their military, at 85 percent, while Bulgarians have the lowest, at 53 percent. Estonia falls in the middle, at 75 percent.

In GLOBSEC’s assessment, Estonia and Finland have the political systems that enable the fastest response in a crisis.

The report describes Finland as Europe’s benchmark for political decision-making readiness. Its legal and institutional framework is based on a long-standing total-defense doctrine that assumes short response timelines and the possibility of strategic surprise.

GLOBSEC analysts further note that political polarization on defense issues in Finland is low, and that the country’s high level of public trust enables decisive action.

In Estonia’s case, the report commends a crisis model shaped by a clear perception of threat and constant hybrid pressure from Russia. It highlights clear legal triggers, regular crisis exercises, and strong political unity as factors that allow Estonia to make decisions within hours rather than days.

Black Sheep

The decision making systems of Slovakia and Bulgaria are considered to be the weakest in terms of the speed of decision-making. In both cases, the concern was that even in a serious crisis, decisions must pass through a long and drawn-out process involving both the government and parliament.

Regarding Slovakia, the report warns that coalition instability could further complicate crisis response, because defense decisions may become politically contested even during emergencies.

While acknowledging that there are significant differences among the ten eastern-flank countries, GLOBSEC warns that collective defense is only as credible as the extent to which the slowest ally allows the others to act. The report concludes that eastern-flank deterrence starts not in Brussels but in national capitals, and that its strength depends on how consistently those capitals can turn plans into usable capabilities.

The focus of NATO exercises has shifted east

The numbers for NATO exercises conducted in Europe over the past two years speak clearly: the overwhelming majority of training took place in allied countries east of Germany.

GLOBSEC divided the exercises in this region into three categories.

The Nordic and Baltic countries focused mainly on fighting in cold-weather conditions and bringing in reinforcements. In Poland, Slovakia, and Czechia, the emphasis was on large-unit maneuvers and testing the north-south logistics corridor. Farther south, the focus was on rapid entry and force-deployment capabilities, supported by amphibious and airborne components.

According to GLOBSEC’s report, NATO conducted its most extensive series of exercises on the eastern flank in 2024–2025 since the end of the Cold War. Across the full length of the front line, the alliance tested the operational foundations of its new regional defense plans. The pattern also pointed to a clear evolution: from large-scale reinforcement exercises in 2024 toward more flexible, multidimensional maneuvers in 2025.

Major exercises on the eastern flank.Photo: GLOBSEC REPORT

Crisis aid could get stuck in a transit ally’s rail tunnel — or in parliament

Although Germany is not directly on the eastern flank, the condition of its roads and railways has a very direct impact on the defensibility of allies bordering Russia.

According to the GLOBSEC report, Germany occupies a key geographic position as an essential NATO hub for moving military equipment and units to the eastern flank. The country borders nine states, seven of them NATO members, and has an extensive transport infrastructure, including roughly 13,000 kilometers of highways and 38,400 kilometers of railways.

However, the report finds that Germany’s ability to serve as a transit country for NATO still leaves much to be desired.

If Germany’s aging bridges can no longer carry heavy military equipment, its tunnels cannot accommodate trains carrying tanks, and its agencies delay transit permits for ammunition and other equipment, all of this lengthens the time it takes, for example, for U.S. units to move from their main European port of arrival in Rotterdam to Poland, the main distribution hub for forces on the eastern flank.

German troops in Bavaria, Grafenwöhr.Photo: Daniel Karmann

The allies are aware of this shortfall. In January 2024, the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland signed a declaration of intent aimed at jointly improving the usability of military transport corridors running from North Sea ports to the eastern flank.

Other military transport-corridor development initiatives have followed. In November 2024, Lithuania, Belgium, Luxembourg, Czechia, and Slovakia joined the same Dutch-German-Polish initiative. In its wake, Lithuania began reinforcing the section of Via Baltica leading toward the Suwałki Gap.

Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania launched work on a southern corridor in July 2024, while Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland agreed in November of the same year to coordinate improvements to military transport corridors across the Nordic region.

GLOBSEC’s analysis notes that the EU’s 2021–2027 budget allocates €1.7 billion to support military mobility and dual-use infrastructure projects. At the same time, the report says that despite some progress compared with the past, available resources remain far below actual needs. As an example, it notes that Germany alone would need at least €30 billion for urgent infrastructure upgrades.

On transit permits, the report highlights an Estonia-led European Defense Fund project to develop a secure digital information-exchange system that would help allies agree more quickly on the movement of military equipment and units.

However, the analysis also acknowledges the current confusion surrounding agreements and decision-making procedures. In some countries, allowing allied units and equipment to pass through still requires a parliamentary decision. In a fast-moving crisis, that could cause critical delays.