The resurgence of clashes between the United States and Iran in the past July has severely questioned Pakistan's role as a mediator.
Earlier, the Islamabad government was praised for its success in pushing the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, which opened space for a ceasefire and technical-level negotiations.
However, such an agreement failed to sustainably stop the cycle of attacks and counterattacks. The US resumed strikes on targets in Iran, while Iran attacked commercial vessels and targets in Gulf countries.
Pakistan's diplomatic success thus became a reflection of the gap between bringing conflicting parties to sign a document and ensuring the agreement is implemented in practice.
The first key reason is that Pakistan has channels of communication with both the US and Iran, but lacks the power to compel both sides to abide by their commitments.
The second limitation lies in the memorandum itself, because the agreement was filled with wording that allowed each party to interpret it according to their own interests.
Thirdly, Pakistan assessed the conflict as a problem manageable through government-level negotiations, while the roots of the crisis relate to power balance and security structures.
Fourthly, both conflicting parties still believe that using force can produce better outcomes than compromise. The US attempted to use military strikes and blockades to pressure Iran to back down, while Iran used its capability to disrupt navigation as a bargaining tool.
Fifthly, Pakistan is not the only mediator. Qatar, Oman, Egypt, China, and Gulf countries all have channels of communication with the conflicting parties. Having multiple mediators increases communication opportunities but also decentralizes the process. At the same time, the US can choose other channels when it sees that negotiations through Pakistan do not meet its strategic needs.
Lastly, Pakistan itself must balance complex relationships. Pakistan shares a border with Iran, relies on border security cooperation, and must be mindful of domestic public sentiment.
On the other hand, Pakistan must maintain relations with the US, Saudi Arabia, China, and Gulf countries, which are important to its economy. The need to maintain relations with all sides makes it difficult for Pakistan to remain neutral.
Pakistan's failure should therefore be explained as a failure in designing and guaranteeing the peace process, rather than being the root cause of the US and Iran tearing up the agreement. Even though the decision to return to using force is the direct responsibility of the US and Iran.
However, Pakistan also bears responsibility as the driver of a framework that had no fact-checking mechanism, no joint committee to manage disputes, no response procedures when violations occurred, and no guarantee that a military ceasefire would proceed in parallel with resolving sanctions and navigation issues.
The most obvious impact of the failed mediation process is the return of the global energy crisis. The Strait of Hormuz is a crucial route for oil and gas transport from the Gulf. When commercial vessels are attacked, navigation is restricted, and the US resumes blockade measures, the market reflects the risk through higher oil prices, insurance premiums, and transport costs.
The impact will be particularly severe for energy-importing countries and those with limited foreign exchange reserves, including Pakistan itself, which is facing pressure from energy prices and trying to secure funding sources for oil imports.
The lesson of this ineffective mediator role is highly instructive. This failure not only affects Pakistan but also triggers a new round of global energy crisis.
