Six Threats to Security in the Black Sea Region
Valeriy Zaluzhny, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2021–2024)
The transformation of the world order, which began with Russia's announcement of its intentions in 2007, and as a result, the return of large-scale armed conflicts, primarily to the European continent, has created an unprecedented existential threat not only to Ukraine's state sovereignty but also directly to the survival of Ukrainians as a nation.
On one hand, the resistance and struggle of the Ukrainian people and modern tools of warfare open a window of opportunity for Ukraine to gain full subjectivity in a new or already formed system of international relations. On the other hand, they force an immediate revision of the conceptual foundations of national security, both for the period of survival and for the future.
This is primarily due to the new opportunities that emerged after Russia's failed attempt to seize Ukraine's territory and the subsequent development of scientific and technological progress.
Rejecting the historical facts that caused the war after Ukraine gained independence, it is precisely the need to ensure one's own security, including through technical integration, that necessitates a complete transformation of the foundations of national and regional security by rethinking its ideological, political, and economic aspects.
And therefore, I very much hope that the next conference on Ukraine's reconstruction will begin with an announcement of the security format in which all this will take place. Because neither Munich nor Davos did this.
Under such conditions, the search for alliances and long-term partnerships in regional and global security is a priority task of the state, as a condition not only for survival but also for long-term peace. Everything else is simply impossible due to the technical and political unpreparedness of the old world, as well as Ukraine's inability to survive in it.
Moreover, it is obvious that the war in Ukraine and the Strait of Hormuz has affected and continues to affect the economic, political, social situation and migration processes not only in Europe and the Persian Gulf region but also throughout the world. Because the economy, which is a derivative of state policy, is global. All these impacts, for all participants in conflicts of this scale—both active and those indirectly involved—are only destructive, with signs of a future deep economic crisis and even the outbreak of an even larger war.
So, today it does not matter whether countries that do not yet hear explosions understand such a prospect. The events themselves that have been happening recently force the search, creation, or strengthening of an existing format of collective security.
Despite the failure to take preventive measures to influence the course of the war in Europe, the very involvement of leading world powers such as the United States, China, Britain, and leading EU countries in the crisis resolution process yields no results.
Gradually, a situation is emerging where, as Henry Kissinger said, "a crisis has arisen that no one wanted to leave voluntarily."
This indicates not only the inadequacy of classical models of collective security but also the actual destruction of the old world order as a security model and the need to urgently search for new effective mechanisms to protect against today's challenges and avoid world war.
Then the question arises: if the need to create a new security architecture in Europe is obvious and almost predictable, is it equally obvious for Ukraine to form the same security environment in the Azov-Black Sea region, where the level of threats for us not only remains stable but also has its own peculiarities due to the diversity of at least the coastal states and their interests and contradictions?
The Azov-Black Sea region is extremely important for ensuring Ukraine's national security not only because of maritime access to the transnational space of trade and resource extraction. Because of the war, this region has already become a separate domain not only for conducting combat operations but also for protecting both the land zone and the port economic infrastructure.
If we consider this region as geopolitical and form future security interests in the prism of the new world order, then it is even more important for Ukraine—due to the possibility of access to neighboring regions, such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa.
All this will also be connected with a previously unknown function of state policy at sea, namely the function of projecting power not only in the region but also beyond its borders.
Of course, thanks to our decisive actions and unprecedented use of new opportunities, Russia not only failed to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea but also, due to such circumstances, lost almost all possibilities for conditional dominance in this region.
The very fact of dominance in the Sea of Azov, as well as the use of the land corridor to Crimea from the territory of Donetsk region, is only a formal temporary historical event, because today it practically makes it impossible to use such opportunities and nullifies all of Russia's efforts. All this gives Ukraine a reason to implement its own strategy in this region.
Of course, everything will depend on the course of the war and the formation of prospects for its end, shaped by relevant strategies united by a single political goal.
Thus, if the political, economic, and military dimensions of the European space are obvious, although currently difficult to achieve, the situation in the Azov-Black Sea region appears more complex due to a number of challenges and threats and will require difficult work to shape the future of the state in this region.
Just as effective security guarantees are essential for sustainable peace, so is the formation of fair relations in the region regarding the use of sea resources an unconditional formula for Ukraine's future existence. The formation of such relations will classically be influenced by both regional and extra-regional players, whose interests must be taken into account. Especially now, when such a window of opportunity is opening.
The Azov-Black Sea region encompasses various coastal states. These include those with a Black Sea coastline, adjacent regions, and various international associations. Besides Russia, these states include three NATO members—Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.
Among these NATO members, Romania and Bulgaria are also EU member states. Turkey, Ukraine, and Georgia are not EU members and have different accession prospects.
Perhaps Moldova—another EU candidate—can also be considered part of the Black Sea region.
Thus, the Black Sea is another zone of confrontation between Russia and the West, where Russia had achieved significant success before the war in Ukraine.
A vivid example is the Mediterranean. Over the past decade, Russia's increased involvement in events in Syria marked a significant expansion of its presence in the Mediterranean and provided access to that sea. Until Ukraine limited Russia's efforts, it was already creating a challenge to European security from both the eastern and southern flanks. It is important to understand that the Russian Black Sea Fleet is the logistical and strategic basis for deploying such capabilities beyond the Black Sea region.
So, what are the strategic interests of alliances and partnerships, and what are the security threats in the Black Sea region today?
1. Absence of a NATO strategy in the Black Sea region
Despite Russia's obvious activity and the actual expansion of NATO through coastal states, there is still no Alliance strategy for the Black Sea. Although it is clear that the strategic importance of this region for NATO is no longer in doubt.
The main mistake is that, historically continuing to treat the Black Sea as "Russia's inland lake," NATO essentially allows Russia to expand its combat capabilities, which since 2000 have taken unprecedented forms and, in fact, allowed the creation of hotbeds of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. We know how that ended in Syria. However, the fate of military bases, including naval bases, remains unknown.
While NATO in this region promoted a policy not of deterrence and defense but of cooperation and dialogue, Russia continued to view the alliance as the main threat to its national security. All this, within the old world order, gives Russia a free hand for expansion not only in the North Caucasus but also in countries like Ukraine and Moldova.
Ukraine will always remember that Russia will certainly take advantage of any opportunity of imbalance to restore its combat capabilities for expansion—whether economic through blocking routes and logistics, or military.
2. EU strategy is ineffective
In May 2025, after a long strategic neglect of this region, the EU presented its strategy for the Black Sea. Despite the traditionally ambitious goals, this strategy in modern conditions, like the White Paper-2030 presented the same year, remains declarative and ineffective, thus only encouraging Russia to more active actions and demonstration of capabilities.
As in the case of the Baltic Sea, any determination not backed by practical steps does not stop Russia. Without creating a body with real powers of influence and without a real response mechanism, such initiatives will always remain merely declarative. Today, even the single issue of protecting critical maritime infrastructure will require not only significant funds but also time. The example of the war in Iran is still available, as is our experience and last night in Romania.
Even the main idea of creating a Black Sea Maritime Security Center remains unrealized. For example, its location and at least conditional mechanisms by which early warning will lead to timely and reliable actions have not been determined.
Thus, although the European Union has expanded and has the prospect of further expansion through countries with access to the Black Sea, and the desire to expand its trade with Africa and the Middle East precisely through the Black Sea, this union has not yet formed a real strategy for protecting and promoting its interests, nor a vision of European security. All this fully satisfies Russia, which pursued a policy of preventing the integration of the Azov-Black Sea region into the European and Western space.
The need to reduce the cost of energy resources and the desire to expand their own markets in the future will certainly lead to the question: how to restore interaction with Russia after the end of the war in Ukraine? This could lead to new splits in the Euro-Atlantic community, weakening its long-term strategic coherence, including in this region.
At the same time, the constant sense of threat from Russia now still promotes a broad understanding among all coastal states in favor of NATO and EU membership. Because the feeling of being left alone against Russia, as in the case of Ukraine, and being outside the regional order in the Black Sea will directly affect the domestic political order in such countries and their geopolitical identity.
3. Risk of reopening the Bosphorus Strait for Russian warships
Speaking of extra-regional players and their influence on the region, of course, Turkey should be mentioned. It is a historical and geographical guarantor of compliance with non-littoral policies, which involves keeping extra-regional actors, including NATO countries, out of the Black and Azov Seas.
It is precisely because of Turkey's strict adherence to the Montreux Convention and its blocking of warship passage through the Bosphorus Strait during the war that Russia was prevented from reinforcing its fleet, limiting its offensive and strike capabilities.
With the weakening of Russia's military presence in the region, the most dangerous challenge is the possibility of reopening the strait for the passage of Russian warships. Because a ceasefire and the end of the war, in the absence of strategies and real mechanisms in NATO and the EU, will give Russia the opportunity to demand from Turkey the reopening of the strait and, accordingly, the restoration of its military power in the region.
Russia will have the opportunity to regain control over trade flows, threatening Ukraine's economic viability. And later, to restore its naval power in the Black Sea and prepare for the next phase of the conflict.
That is why this must be taken into account not only when formulating the parameters of a ceasefire and peace agreement but also in subsequent steps to establish rules in the region. Therefore, how relations between Turkey and Ukraine, Turkey and the West, and Turkey and Russia develop in the Black Sea will likely have a decisive influence on the formation of the regional geopolitical order.
4. Growing influence of China
Despite the obvious efforts of Russia and Turkey to limit access to the Black and Azov Seas for non-littoral actors, it can be confidently stated that the influence of an extra-regional player, namely China, is evident and undeniable. And if this is not a threat, it is certainly a challenge that all countries in the region must reckon with.
China is gradually and cautiously expanding its presence in the Black Sea region. Traditionally, China's economic influence is steadily growing and is generally welcomed by states in the region due to its attractiveness. And such obvious interest of Black Sea states in the potential of Chinese economic cooperation could lead to a completely different geopolitical formation in the region, which will eventually force a reassessment of the role of all actors in the region.
It is unlikely that this will cause competition and tension in the region, but it certainly first brings a loss of critical infrastructure, and later of fundamental allies and institutions.
For Ukraine, it is important not to forget that it is thanks to China that Russia still has the ability to kill Ukrainians and support its own economy, bypassing the sanctions pressure of the same regional actors.
5. Russia's desire to dominate the Black Sea
Perhaps the main destabilizing factor in the region remains Russia and its desire to dominate the Black Sea. For Russia, the Black Sea is not just a natural sphere of influence and dominance; it is a strategic platform necessary for its global ambitions far beyond the region.
Moreover, while the historical and traditional origins of such desire remain understandable, as do its military actions, its ability to interfere in the affairs of the Black Sea states is an absolute threat to the formation of a security environment not only in the region. Such interference is based on well-established practices of influencing domestic political, informational, and economic spheres, strategic manipulation of social, ethnic, and economic vulnerabilities, and the cultivation and development of influential local intermediaries whose interests coincide with Russia's, even if they are clearly not pro-Russian.
Most dangerously, as in the case of Ukraine, Russia's interference can be too covert depending on the circumstances. Whether this is happening right now in one of the countries of the region is not correct to say. But certainly all this happened in Ukraine, with known consequences.
6. Wide availability of modern weapons and technologies
All these processes, which are associated with gaining geopolitical subjectivity and, as a result, guaranteed security, must necessarily be backed by capabilities of force and mechanisms for its implementation.
It is because of this that perhaps the most serious challenge of our time is connected not only with the rapid development of new weapons and forms and methods of their use but also with the fact that these modern technologies have become accessible not only to leading maritime powers but also to terrorist groups, insurgent formations, or even criminal elements.
When we talk about Ukraine, in the Azov-Black Sea region it already not only has an arsenal and experience of use but is also steadily developing its capabilities. Modern warfare has demonstrated the destructive power of relatively cheap naval and aerial drones. Their main capability also lies in overloading and quickly depleting air defense and anti-drone systems of both large combat ships and port infrastructure protection systems.
As in the sky, at sea the cost of a naval drone is hundreds of times less than the cost of an interceptor missile and thousands of times less than the cost of a struck vessel, creating a problem of economic exhaustion. Yes, today these systems are in a stage of rapid development, showing both advantages and disadvantages. However, it is clear that over time, all this will lead to a revision of the fundamental principles of operations at sea.
In conditions of compact seas and coastal zones, where most naval combat clashes historically occur, even limited use of robotic systems in the future will allow achieving significant efficiency that is at the level of or exceeds the capabilities of a classical fleet. Innovative solutions in the field of naval drones not only compensate for the technical limitations of classical maritime platforms but also create fundamentally new capabilities for power projection, as confirmed by the experience of the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation in the Black Sea.
Thus, if the basis of the global economy remains sea routes, which transport about 90% of all goods, and the port infrastructure that supports them, then it is obvious that their security is a direct strategic priority of any maritime state and an indirect interest for the rest of the world's states.
An obvious conclusion is that security in the Black Sea and throughout the Azov-Black Sea region will depend on building a real counterweight to challenges and threats, the main one being to prevent Russia's dominance in this region.
Given the Black Sea coastline, unique experience in applying technologies in modern warfare, and Ukraine's aspiration for democratic transformations, it is impossible to create a reliable counterweight to Russia in the Black Sea without Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine's participation in shaping the future security space in the region is possible only through participation in a political and security association.
Given the fragmentation of the region and the presence of differences in interests, forming a future order today is extremely important. All this should encourage NATO not only to invest in the military potential of coastal states but also to create new strategies to strengthen its presence in the Black Sea, and especially beyond this region.
It is the support of Ukraine as a Black Sea country and a powerful naval state, as well as support for European regional partnership, that is the basis for ensuring the security of the Azov and Black Seas and ensuring the security of Europe from the southern direction.
