On July 7 and 8, Ankara will host the NATO summit at one of the most critical junctures in recent years. Officially, the agenda includes Ukraine, strengthening the defense industry, collective defense, and implementation of the new target for defense spending amounting to 5% of GDP.
The decision on the 5% is considered by many to be the biggest change in the functioning of the Alliance since the end of the Cold War. The new model stipulates that 3.5% of GDP will go to purely military spending and an additional 1.5% to infrastructure and cyber defense.
Although the decision has already been approved politically, the real discussion concerns its implementation. Today, none of the major economies of the Alliance have reached this level. On the contrary, many European countries still struggle even to achieve the previous target of 2%.
Closer to the new framework are Poland and the Baltic countries. Lithuania has announced plans for spending approaching 5% to 6% of GDP, while Estonia and Latvia have also committed to moving toward the same target. Poland, which is already among the top in the Alliance, is pushing for an accelerated timeline.
On the other hand, countries like Spain, Italy, and Belgium appear cautious as achieving the target requires enormous fiscal adjustment. It is no coincidence that the issue of burden-sharing among allies will dominate the behind-the-scenes discussions of the summit.
For Greece, this discussion is of particular interest. The country has historically been among those with the highest defense spending as a percentage of GDP and can argue that it has already undertaken a significant part of the obligations that the Alliance now asks of its members.
What Turkey is "looking for"
Behind the official agenda, however, lies a second, less visible but perhaps more important discussion. Ankara seeks to capitalize on its role as host to appear as an irreplaceable pillar of the Alliance.
The war in Ukraine, developments in Syria, energy corridors, instability in the Middle East, and migration flows have increased the geopolitical significance of Turkey.
The Turkish leadership believes that this particular conjuncture allows it to claim greater influence both vis-à-vis the United States and European allies.
At the same time, the issues of the S-400 and F-35 remain open. Officially, the US position has not changed. As long as the Russian S-400 remain on Turkish soil, Ankara's return to the F-35 program remains extremely difficult.
However, many diplomats believe that Turkey will try to use the summit to improve the climate in its relations with Washington and restart the discussion for a gradual restoration of trust.
What "burns" Athens
For Athens, the interest of the summit is not limited to arms issues or US-Turkey relations. Equally important is Ankara's effort to highlight the so-called Southern Wing of the Alliance as a key priority of NATO.
Turkey seeks to strengthen the argument that the West cannot design policy in the eastern Mediterranean / Middle East without the active participation of Ankara.
From the Greek side, however, the question remains whether Turkey's increased geopolitical value will be accompanied by greater respect for the obligations arising from its membership in the Alliance. Turkish positions on "Blue Homeland" and Cyprus have not changed, while Turkish rhetoric continues to challenge basic Greek and Cypriot positions in the eastern Mediterranean.
The Cyprus dimension also takes on particular weight. The strengthening of defense cooperation between Cyprus and France, the increasing presence of European forces in the region, and the connection of the eastern Mediterranean with broader European security plans create a new strategic environment that Ankara is watching with particular attention.
The communiqués…
Most summits are judged by the decisions recorded in the final communiqué. The Ankara summit may be judged by something different: by the political balances that will be shaped behind the scenes and by the messages that the key players of the Alliance will send.
The main question is whether Turkey will use its hosting of the summit to strengthen its relationship with the West or whether it will attempt to turn its geopolitical importance into a bargaining tool against its allies.
For Greece, the answer to this question has immediate significance. It concerns not only Athens-Ankara relations but the overall security framework in the eastern Mediterranean.
Geography makes Turkey an important ally for NATO. However, the question for many Western capitals is whether this strategic value will be accompanied by behavior that strengthens the cohesion of the Alliance or whether it will be used as a means of pressure and demanding concessions.
This is the real reason why the Ankara summit goes beyond the limits of yet another NATO summit. Behind the discussions on percentages, equipment, and budgets lies the effort to redefine relations between the West and a country that wishes to remain in the core of the Alliance, without abandoning its own autonomous regional ambitions.
