Liberty Square: Don't Be Intimidated by Beijing—Intelligence Against China Must Be Strengthened!
2026/06/21 05:30
◎ Zai Mi
When the National Security Bureau set up a "Chinese People's Contact Window," China's Taiwan Affairs Office immediately issued a strong condemnation, threatened countermeasures, and warned that those providing intelligence could be held accountable. Beijing's urgency is not just routine protest; it effectively admits one thing: if people inside China can safely pass information out, the authoritarian narrative will no longer be entirely monopolized by the authorities.
When Taiwan talks about national security, it often focuses on the island itself: investigating leaks, preventing united front operations, and countering disinformation. All of these are necessary, but if our eyes are always fixed on this side of the strait, risks are often only identified when they reach our doorstep. China's military deployments, economic pressures, internal struggles, or social discontent can all affect cross-strait security before they appear in public information. Being able to hear, verify, and discern earlier is precisely the value of intelligence work.
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Beijing calls this infiltration and sabotage, which sounds righteous, but deliberately omits the other half of reality: China has been collecting intelligence from Taiwan's military, businesses, academia, local networks, and online communities for years, and has wrapped united front work into daily exchanges. China can reach into all sectors of Taiwan, yet demands that Taiwan not establish counter-intelligence channels—this logic essentially wants Taiwan to accept a one-sided beating.
The National Security Bureau still bears the responsibility of platform design. If such a platform is turned into a political show, it will quickly damage trust. For contacts inside China, a single contact could entail personal risk; for Taiwan, the information received could also be mixed with false intelligence, entrapment, counter-intelligence designs, or political manipulation. The more we face a closed regime, the more the National Security Bureau must make procedures low-profile, meticulous, and verifiable.
Viewed in the context of international intelligence competition, this should not be described as Taiwan's unilateral provocation. The more opaque a closed system is, the more democratic countries that base their judgments solely on external speculation effectively cede the security rhythm to their opponents. Taiwan needs a channel that can translate changes inside China into early warnings. The more Beijing rushes to intimidate potential informants, the more it proves its fear of real situations leaking out.
Taiwan must uphold the rule of law, confidentiality, and institutional oversight. People willing to provide credible intelligence should know there is a safe channel; intelligence agencies must also understand that intelligence work has limits and constraints. The more Beijing tries to seal off information, the more Taiwan must hold this early warning line; otherwise, national security intelligence will always be trapped in post-hoc remediation, unable to see the direction before a crisis takes shape.
(The author is a retired person)
