On February 28, 2025, at a meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the White House, the US president categorically stated that Ukraine has no trump cards. Donald Trump was confident that Kyiv is critically dependent on Washington's support and that he would be able to quickly reach a major agreement with Putin.
Ukraine's needs regarding national survival, preservation of its territories and economy were completely ignored by the 47th American leader as unworthy of attention. For the creator of MAGA, the only guarantees of security and implementation of the agreement were the words of the Russian president that he would supposedly stop if he were given Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions without a fight.
It was extremely important for Trump to quickly resolve the Russian-Ukrainian war because that was what he promised voters during the campaign. The words that the war would never have happened if he were president, along with accusations against Biden and Obama, sounded louder than anything else.
The American demand for aid to Ukraine and ending the conflict was such that Trump simply could not forget about it and enjoy golf 24/7. Apparently, the billionaire president’s plan was to resolve the conflict as quickly as possible by pressuring the side that seemed weak to him, flirting with the aggressor, and declaring his own victory. What the consequences of such agreements might be in a few years did not interest Trump at all, because "after us, the flood."
More than two long years have passed since the statement about the lack of cards, and several stages of surreal Washington fluctuations — from accusations of Zelenskyy unwilling to end the war to loosening sanctions against Russia. The Americans significantly reduced the volume of military aid to Ukraine, limited supplies of PAC-3 missiles for intercepting ballistic targets, made loud statements, and through Witkoff, in exchange for a cheburek, promised Putin a bunch of things that remained unknown (partly because the negotiator forgot about them since he had no stenographer, and partly because he spoke in Russian without an interpreter and did not understand everything).
The communication of Kirill Dmitriev with Trump's inner circle, rising oil prices, and reports to the Russian dictator about constant victories at the front undoubtedly gave Putin confidence in the possibility, if not fully achieving his strategic goals, then at least biting off more Ukrainian territories and getting away with it. However, the aggressor country's economy shows a significant decline, and revenues from energy trade are shrinking due to regular strikes by oil workers.
In 53 of Russia's 83 regions, as well as in the occupied territories, fuel sales restrictions are already in effect, as strikes at refineries have led to a shortage of gasoline and diesel production. Crimea and the captured south of Ukraine are gradually turning into a territory without logistics, the invaders' offensive is stalling along almost the entire front line, and Kyiv's ability to attack entire factories is only growing, while Moscow's defense capabilities are melting away.
So, has Ukraine obtained the trump cards that Trump sarcastically spoke about two years ago? And how realistic are forecasts that Russia can be seriously seated at the negotiating table — read in the material of 24 Kanal.
Putin. Results: Russia is plunging into uncontrollable "dvyzhukha"
Commenting on events at the front during a direct line at the end of 2024, Putin called the war "dvyzhukha." Like, it gets boring when nothing happens.
So, less than 18 months later, "dvyzhukha" has fully fallen on Russia. On a scale that no one could have thought of relatively recently. Attacks by Ukrainian drones, which started with a small number of drones once a month, have turned into daily painful strikes involving hundreds of devices.
The daily hunt for air defense systems, as well as mass raids over a long period, have significantly reduced Russia's air defense capabilities: the invaders have neither the necessary number of launchers, radars, nor missiles. Putin has concentrated all free and working systems near his bunker and in Moscow, while generals can only guess what the Defense Forces will strike next and where to concentrate defenses. However, the latter seems literally impossible due to the huge number of targets and the limited capabilities of the aggressors.
So it turns out that the gas station country is forced to buy fuel from allied partners because it cannot meet its own needs, nor can it protect its critical facilities. Russia's inability to counter Ukrainian long-range drones is seen both in the US, Europe, and even in Asia, where Moscow has many allies. However, no less important is the fact that the Russians themselves saw this openly.
After strikes on Tuapse and attacks on almost all oil refineries on the European territory of the aggressor country, propagandists limited themselves to weak reactions. Local Telegram channels avoided writing news about the consequences of the raids or simply kept silent about why, for example, an oil rain was falling in the city. However, the drone raid on Moscow had equally important kinetic and cognitive effects. The shutdown of the refinery that supplied 40% of the fuel needs of the Russian capital itself exacerbates the gasoline shortage crisis. At the same time, the demonstrative air parade of Ukrainian drones over Moscow showed that the war has returned to its "home harbor."
Millions of Muscovites who never took an interest in politics, existed apart from the war, and somehow lived in an outdated paradigm of "we don't interfere with your business, and you, in turn, provide us with security, stability, and social payments," suddenly realized that the probability of dying from a drone or a Pantsir missile is quite real. The war returned to Russia not only after Ukrainian forces took control of part of the Kursk region, not when Belgorod was blacked out, but when "Lyutyi," "Banderol," and FPV drones passed through the super-powerful multi-echelon missile defense system of Moscow.
No matter how much Trump talks about Russia not being able to lose this war, no matter how much Putin himself puffs out his cheeks trying to prove that everything is going according to his multi-stage plan, the result, as they say, is on the scoreboard (or on the lid of the Moscow Refinery tank).
War correspondents who very convincingly advise stocking up on buckwheat, salt, and stew, thousands of memes created by Russians that Stalin would never have brought the state to such a state, talks about "it's time to finish" in the State Duma clearly indicate the beginning of changes in the perception of this power.
Of course, Muscovites still have many lessons to learn in forming cause-and-effect relationships, but nothing accelerates learning better than a good old "February" drone. That is why non-working airports, air defense operations, and flyovers of long-range drones followed by strikes over Moscow are extremely important cognitive impacts. And we still have the production of Ukrainian ballistic missiles on the way.
In a word, it seems that the "movement" has completely gotten out of the Kremlin's control. Although it is not about any revolutionary manifestations or prospects of a "Russian revolt," Putin, in the perception of millions of Russians, is turning from a courageous leader into a weak old man who constantly complains that he was "cheated."
In the information space (with or without the authorities' consent), more and more often not "we cannot repeat" is heard, but completely different rhetorical questions: "why did we start all this?"
On the front, the Russians have no victories
In addition to a bunch of problems in the rear, the Russian authorities also faced a clear stall on the front. Although almost every commander among the Russians keeps two maps – real and victorious – for a very long time the invading army has not demonstrated any significant success. All statements by Putin and his associates that "everything is going according to plan" and the Russian army is victoriously advancing on every section of the front are brutally shattered by reality.
Threats like "otherwise it will be like in Kupyansk" clearly demonstrate that strategically Russia has reached a dead end.
Of course, fierce and terrible battles continue on the line of combat contact, the occupiers are slowly advancing towards Kostiantynivka and turning the city into a "grey zone," but they are paying a terrible price. For many months in a row, the occupation army loses more personnel than it recruits, and the amount of territory controlled by Moscow tends to gradually shrink in the near future.
The destruction of logistics routes in the south could well lead to the expansion of the "grey zone," and this is understood by absolutely everyone, except, perhaps, the top political leadership of the aggressor country.
Therefore, it is not surprising that various war correspondents sometimes start whining and thinking: "why did we start all this?" After all, it turns out that when your army wins, no one asks questions about the justice of the war. And when there is no gasoline and there is a risk of getting a drone in the face, a lot of questions arise, like, the results of Putin's rule are not what was expected.
Russians are proud of their imaginary greatness, but even a parade on "Victory Freak Day" cannot be held without Zelenskyy's permission. Because of Putin's adventure, they lost almost all heavy equipment, spent more than a trillion dollars on the war, but got a crooked "Oreshnik" and problems with air defense. The Ukrainian Defense Forces, with their medium-range strikes, are disrupting the enemy's upcoming offensive, preventing them from accumulating resources for an attack.
According to strategic communications specialist Yuriy Bohdanov, if Ukraine maintains the level of tension in Crimea over the next few months, the Russian military machine could indeed break down.
Crimea has become a risk zone, a vulnerability. The more Russia spends forces on maintaining Crimea, providing for its population, the harder it will be for it to wage the war overall. We have already turned Crimea into an expense item of the Russian budget and Russian military machine. In all likelihood, in the event of a complete isolation of Crimea, the first to flee from there will be Russians. If the fuel problem drags on for at least a few weeks, they will begin to flee en masse,
Bohdanov believes.
The only trump cards left for Putin are total mobilization and nuclear weapons. However, using the latter is like shooting yourself in the head, because then Russia would become a pariah even for its best ally, China. Carrying out mobilization measures in a new large-scale format will lead to a number of economic consequences.
Russia's economy is held together by a thread
Head of the President's Office Kyrylo Budanov, when he was still head of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, said that Russia has time to exit the war until the end of 2025. But apparently, calculations of the possible consequences of continuing active hostilities either did not reach Putin or were rejected by him. Therefore, as of April 2026, the aggressor country has a huge budget hole the size of Moscow's annual budget or the total expenditure estimates of all regions except the capital.
Russia is breaking records for labor shortages, since for more than 4 years of war, a large share of the working-age population has been exhausted in the steppes of Donbas or left the country during the "partial mobilization." For at least some economic improvement, the aggressor state needs multi-billion dollar investments, labor hands, specialists and engineers, high-class managers. But there are almost no unemployed specialists on the market, since the majority of the population has been living according to the scheme "finished 8th grade — stole — sat — got out — died in the SMO — became a white Lada" for more than 20 years.
In addition, due to the fuel shortage, farmers are in limbo, because it is simply impossible to carry out sowing and harvest without thousands of tons of diesel. If Russia cannot find a way out of the crisis, farmers will face a wave of bankruptcies, and residents of the aggressor country will face exorbitant prices and food shortages.
At the same time, almost the only option for Moscow is to buy fuel from other countries, but this will increase the budget hole and lead to skyrocketing prices. Moreover, gasoline and diesel need to be stored somewhere, and oil depots are already under constant targeting by the Defense Forces.
Almost all businesses in Russia show "negative growth," key energy companies have long been unprofitable, and the banking system is kept on artificial respiration in the form of printing money to maintain liquidity. Therefore, if Putin decides to conduct mass mobilization, the inflation rate in the country will soar to sky-high heights. After all, every potential occupier needs not only to be torn from the workplace but also somehow provided for, trained, transported to the front line, and his family given money for a white Lada.
But the Kremlin has no money for either salaries or payments in case of death, since the economy simply cannot withstand the continuation of the war with Ukraine.
In addition, according to military expert Serhiy Hrabskyi, open mobilization is dangerous for Putin not only because of possible political reaction.
Previous experience has already shown that together with conscription, Russia faces an outflow of able-bodied people, and now such an outflow would be even more painful: the country is deeper involved in the war, losses are much greater, and the personnel deficit is more noticeable. In October 2022, 320 thousand people were mobilized, and Russia instantly lost about a million labor hands,
the expert notes.
Can the Russian leadership sit down at the negotiating table by autumn to exit the war?
In fact, the entire negotiation process, which lasted from the beginning of the full-scale war to the present, boiled down to one thing — Putin's demands for Ukraine to sign a capitulation. But while the Russians did not make any concessions, the situation has changed quite significantly. Kyiv has gained leverage over Russia, strengthened its capabilities to strike critical enemy facilities (in Trump's words, "cards"), while Moscow has sagged in all military and, most importantly, economic indicators.
Political scientist Volodymyr Fesenko noted in a comment to 24 Kanal that at the moment it is completely unknown whether Russia is really ready to negotiate and return to peace talks.
The Kremlin has not yet shown readiness to end the war and is betting on continuing hostilities. If the US joins political and economic pressure, this could affect the process, but does not guarantee quick negotiations,
Fesenko emphasized.
But the conditions for this have already been created. Putin can, of course, ignore them, but that is the same as ignoring reality and living in a fictional world. Like that Salazar.
It should be understood that Putin's desire to stop the war directly depends on his awareness of the impossibility of moving further in the plane of active hostilities, because so far the dictator seems confident that in the summer he will be able to break through Ukraine's defenses.
Therefore, whether the Kremlin will demonstrate readiness to exit the war will become clear only after the completion of Russia's offensive campaign, which, by and large, has not even begun yet (and, perhaps, will not be able to begin due to effective strikes on the middle echelon).
