Weekend Special: Two Tests for the Trump Administration
Five weeks ago, U.S. President Donald Trump held a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. Now, his administration faces two major tests in the Indo-Pacific region.
Arms Sales to Taiwan as "Bargaining Chip" Gives Beijing Room to Maneuver
The first test is entirely of Trump's own making. After meeting with Xi, Trump described arms sales to Taiwan as "a very good bargaining chip" and announced that a previously approved batch of arms sales had been temporarily "shelved." The British Financial Times subsequently reported that Beijing has yet to approve a visit by Elbridge Colby, the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as it waits to see Trump's decision on the arms sales.
During Trump's first term, he normalized the arms sales process. Instead of periodically bundling arms sales into large batches and deliberately avoiding major diplomatic milestones between the U.S. and China, he adopted a "case-by-case" model: approve requests as they come, without regard to timing sensitivity. This benefited Washington, Taipei, and even Beijing, creating greater predictability for all three sides. Moreover, by decoupling U.S.-China diplomacy from the arms sales process, it theoretically created space for negotiations on other issues where compromise might actually be possible.
However, during his second term, Trump abandoned this approach. In exchange for a meeting with Xi, he voluntarily delayed approval of a batch of arms sales to Taiwan, but the Chinese leader gave almost nothing of value in return. Now, Beijing is watching to see if it can repeat the same tactic with a U.S. under secretary-level official. That is the test.
The continued existence of Taiwan as a de facto independent state serves U.S. interests, as clearly stated in Trump's National Security Strategy (NSS). If Trump is willing to use Taiwan's self-defense capability as a bargaining chip to secure Colby's visit to Beijing, Xi will perceive that for Trump, the integrity of the "First Island Chain" emphasized in the NSS is ultimately less important than a "constructive strategic stability relationship" with China.
China's Island-Building in the South China Sea: A Direct Challenge to the U.S.
The second test also relates to the First Island Chain, which stretches from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. In early June, the Philippines confirmed that China had installed new floating structures inside the lagoon of Scarborough Shoal (known in the Philippines as Bajo de Masinloc and in Taiwan as Democracy Reef), a disputed feature in the South China Sea off the west coast of Luzon.
Over the past two decades, China's actions at Scarborough Shoal have triggered some of the most serious tensions in the South China Sea. During a standoff in 2012, the U.S. mediated a mutual withdrawal. However, after Manila withdrew its vessels, Beijing violated the agreement, allowing China to take de facto control of the atoll. Two years later, Beijing began its island-building campaign in the South China Sea, further asserting control over the disputed waters and establishing a series of military bases, again breaking a promise made to President Barack Obama at the White House not to "militarize" the area.
Now, Beijing is once again encroaching. There is no doubt that China is directly challenging the United States. If Washington fails to respond effectively to China's installation of floating structures at Scarborough Shoal, permanent structures will eventually appear. Mischief Reef, another disputed feature that China seized from the Philippines 31 years ago, now hosts a military base with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, capable of housing 24 fighter jets, as well as surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. Manila has every reason to fear that Scarborough Shoal could become another Mischief Reef. That would place Chinese intelligence assets and power projection capabilities just 150 miles from Luzon and 220 miles from Manila.
Establishing an outpost at Scarborough Shoal would put the Chinese military in a better position to coerce the Philippines, undermine future joint operations by the "Quad Squad" (the emerging security partnership among Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States), and impede allied intervention in a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. Does President Trump care? If he chooses to meet this challenge, the diplomatic, economic, and military tools are at hand. That is the second test.
Passing the Two Tests: Trump Must Stop Conceding to China
To pass the first test, President Trump must stop making concessions to China on the Taiwan issue. This means he should notify Congress of new arms sales without hesitation. To pass the second test, President Trump must draw a clear bottom line—or more precisely, draw a red line in these waters—and inform Xi Jinping that China's actions at Scarborough Shoal run counter to the strategic stability relationship that Beijing so eagerly desires.
(Editor's note: On June 17, the Philippine government stated that the floating structures at Scarborough Shoal had been removed, and China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has confirmed this.)
(Michael Mazza is a senior director at the Indo-Pacific Security Institute (formerly the 2049 Project Institute) and a non-resident senior fellow at the Global Taiwan Research Center. Translated by Chen Hongda, International News Center.)
